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The thesis discusses the findings of an investigation into the use of novel condition
monitoring techniques for oil-paper insulated high voltage equipment as used on the
Eskom Main Transmission System. This research into the monitoring of the condition
of high voltage (RV) insulation was undertaken because of the high failure rate of
high voltage current transformers (eT's) and transformer bushings on the Eskom
Transmission National Grid. These failures reached unacceptably high levels in the
1990's. The extent of failures has been quantified and was the driving motivation
behind this research.
Techniques for the condition assessment and condition monitoring of oil-paper filled
high voltage equipment have traditionally focused on off-line techniques, in particular
off-line tan delta measurements. This requires that the equipment be removed from
service temporarily, but at widely spaced intervals before a measurement may be
taken (typically every 3 to 6 years). Such techniques will not be able to detect faulty
equipment where the insulation integrity deteriorates rapidly, resulting in catastrophic
failure with risk to both adjoining equipment and personnel. The need for an on-line
technique for detecting deteriorating insulation prior to failure was identified in the
early 1990's and various systems were developed.
This research investigation has focussed on assessing the use of on-line relative tan
delta monitoring of RV insulation and compares this to off-line monitoring. In
particular, the ability of such a relative tan delta measurement system to detect
deteriorating oil-paper insulation has been assessed. The investigation has included
the design, construction and commissioning of a dedicated test facility located at
Eskom's Tugela substation. This test facility is unique in the world. This test facility
has resulted in a number of experiments that have provided invaluable insight into
possible failure modes of oil-filled high voltage equipment and the ability of on-line
techniques to detect rapid failure modes has been carefully assessed.
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Further assessment of the on-line monitoring systems was also undertaken at various
Eskom operational installations. The results of these tests and operational monitoring
are addressed in this research. The research work and its findings are assessed against
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1.1 Overview of the installed base of current transformers and
bushings within Eskom
Table 1.1 below indicates that Eskom Transmission has the following hermetically
sealed high voltage current transformers and transformer bushings installed in the 135
transmission substations, which comprise the National grid. These 135 substations
comprise equipment operating at voltage levels from 66kV up to 400kV. The value of
this plant is in excess ofR700 million.





Average per 66 20
Substation
Table 1.1: The mstalled base of current transformers and transformer bushmgs on the
Eskom, Transmission Network [1].
The current transformers (eT's) listed above have been manufactured by over 10
manufacturers, one or two of these being local South African designs, but the bulk of
them have been manufactured in Europe.
The transformer bushings listed above were mostly supplied by the original
transformer manufacturers. The earlier model transformers (manufactured from the
1940's to late 1970's) were mostly manufactured in Europe, but the later models were
made in South Africa and all the transformer bushings were imported.
In the 1980's to mid 1990's, there was little access to the latest technology as most
manufacturers refused to supply the SA market, as international sanctions were
imposed on South Africa. Most equipment purchased during this period was the only
equipment that could be sourced at the time.
All the CT's and bushings mentioned in Table 1.1 for the 132kV - 400kV range were
manufactured having RV insulation consisting of a composition of vacuum dried
paper and mineral oil rather than resin impregnated paper. The sheets of paper are
wrapped around the conductor, in layers, then vacuum dried and oil impregnated, the
insulation is protected inside a porcelain shell, which is filled with mineral insulating
oil and hermetically sealed to prevent moisture and oxygen ingress.
Due to the hermetic seal, the quality of the high voltage paper and oil insulation
cannot be easily evaluated, without breaking the seal and introducing moisture. The
quality of the hermetic seal deteriorates over the 30 years of service life in the harsh
South African conditions, where summer temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius are
common and moisture ingress and oxidation may deteriorate the insulation quality in
time. The result may be the unexpected failure of the paper and oil insulation and the
violent destruction of the current transformer or transformer bushing. Associated with
this failure is the potential damage to adjacent plant. This would include the adjacent
CT on the nearest phase to the failed CT. There are also outages caused to busbars
and other circuits when the protection clears the fault, as well as outages and voltage
depressions caused to customer supplies.
Table 1.2 below lists the recorded fault failures of CT's in the period 1983 - 1999.
Included are the estimated costs of these failures to Eskom Transmission. It is noted
that accurate records have not always been kept.
Year (19--) 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total Values
400kV 2 1 2 2 1 7 2 1 7 I 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 32 R3,2M




'" Other 0 0 3 1 1 5 2 0 13 6 6 7 0 6c 2 3 1 56 RO,8M
:J
Total failures 3 1 6 8 10 23 5 3 24 7 9 7 2 11 3 5 2 129 R8,lM
Table 1.2: Recorded current transformer fmlures on the Eskom transmission network
Other, denotes 132kV, 88kV and 66kV [1].
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Table 1.2 indicates that there have been a total number of 129 recorded CT's that
failed, which cost the utility R8.1 million in 1999 in SA rands. Of particular concern
were the high failure rates observed in 1988 and 1991. The tabulated data is shown
graphically in Figure 1.1 below.
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Figure 1.1: Graph of CT failures on the Transmission network, 1983 - 1999 [2].
1.2 The cost of HV plant failures
The failure of a CT if positioned on a bus coupler bay in the HV yard of a substation
results in the fault causing the shut down of all the equipment at that voltage level.
Thus, if a 275kV CT fails, then the entire 275kV supply will be switched off in that
area. This results in the total loss of supply to customers in the particular area. One
example would be the failure of a bus coupler 275kV CT at Illovo substation in 1996
shutting down the station. In the case of Illovo substation, where the shut down of the
station affects the supplies to the National petrol refmeries and other major industries,
with the consequential risk of fire, damage, customer plant outages and damage to the
product. Damage to customer plant and equipment can result in a drop in petrol
production and this reduction in supply may affect the country and the economy.
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Similarly a CT failure at Impala substation in Richards Bay may result in the loss of
electrical supply to the major smelters, long-term damage to customer's plant and
damage to and a loss of product.
From recorded failures and the cost to re-establish the circuit, the adjacent circuit and
the loss of sales, Eskom estimates a cost ofR250 000 per 275kV or 400kV CT failure
incident, whereas the cost of one new unit is RlOOOOO. This cost of a replacement CT
increases the total value of incidents on 275kV and above, from R7,3 million to
R18,25 million (a factor of 2,5 X the cost of the failed plant), resulting in a loss to
Eskom of over RI million per year. Obviously some individual incidents have resulted
in more serious damage. An example would include failures at a power station where
the failure of a current transformer caused the shutdown of several generators at a cost
of R3 million. This value excluded the cost to customers due to loss of supply and
production losses caused by outages and voltage dips.
The number of bushing failures for the period of 1996 - 1999 is shown in Table 1.3
below.
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Number of 2 2 - - 4
Faulted
Bushings




Cost R13M R12,5M - - R25,5M
Table 1.3: Recorded transformer bushmg faIlures on the Eskom transmission network
Note: Transformers were totally destroyed, because of fire ongmating from the
bushing failure and the power arc that followed, setting the oil alight, burning the
whole unit [1].
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The average cost of destroyed transformers over the previous 3 years was R8.5
million per year.
The possibility also exists that during the failure of a current transformer or a
transformer bushing, operating personnel could be present and could have their lives
at risk or face possible injury.
1.3 Current transformers investigated
The particular CT utilized in this research is the Balteau SAX 245 CT. The failure
rates of these CT's are included to indicate the reason for the choice of this CT as the
device under investigation.
There are 493 Balteau SAX 245 CT's installed on the Transmission Grid [3]. A
number of these have failed (records show 7 in the last 9 years). These failures have
caused an increase in the risk level to the reliability and security of the system,
especially in the KwaZulu-Natal Grid area, during specific incidents at Illovo
substation and three incidents at Impala substation where the CT's failed. The life
expectancy of the CT is 25 to 30 years and in most cases the CT's which failed in
operation had achieved this expected age since they were installed between 1971 and
1974 in the high humidity, high temperature areas along the East coast of South
Africa. The area is well known for high rainfall, high summer temperatures reaching
as high as 40°C, and high relative humidity (in the 90% range). As the area is along
the coastline, the porcelain sheds are regularly polluted with a coating of marine
pollution and have to be cleaned about twice per annum (normally done using hand
washing with suitable solvents). A diagram and explanation of the Balteau SAX 245
CT is included in Appendix 1.
1.4 The failure mechanism
The mechanism of the degradation of the RV insulation and electrical failure of a CT
or bushing [3] results in a power arc being formed inside the porcelain shell under the
oil. The arc generates large quantities of gas, namely acetylene, methane, ethane and
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ethylene. The generation of these gases in turn builds up the pressure in the porcelain
shell. Under high fault level conditions the pressure may exceed the strength of the
shell and the CT may explode. When this occurs the porcelain is shot in all directions
(up to 70 metres away from the failed CT). The flying porcelain pieces may damage
adjacent plant and if personnel are in the area, the shrapnel may pose a risk to life.
Damage to adjacent plant may be in the form of porcelain damage to breakers, CT's,
isolator's etc., which may require replacement. The exploding porcelain may puncture
adjacent transformers resulting in a loss of oil. The exploding CT may catch fire
which may spread as the oil bums. Eskom Transmission has considered the
probability of the damage to adjacent plant and the repair thereof and has adopted a
figure of 2.5 times the cost of a CT to reinstate the circuit. The cost of such an
incident to the economy of South Africa can far exceed the cost to get the plant
operational. Consideration must also be made for the voltage depression experienced
at neighboring Transmission stations where these depressions will affect customer's
supplies and cause plant outages and product damage [3].
Due to the high cost of the failure of a CT, and the influence of the Transmission
Charter listed below, a number of the high risk Balteau SAX 245 CT's were removed
from critical service areas and replaced with modem "fail safe" CT's at Illovo and
Impala substations. These removed Balteau CT's then became available for testing
and research purposes. The Transmission Charter called for the following conditions:
• 100% Availability and sustainability of plant and operating capabilities
• Zero faults on the electrical system
• Zero accidents on the electrical system or in the operation thereof
• Service excellence from satisfied and safe employees
• The lowest cost (Rand per MWH) of electricity in the world [4].
During 1996 there were 11 CT failures and these had impacted seriously on the
performance of customer supplies. These 11 CT failures were the highest number
recorded per annum for the last 5 years and had caused multiple generator unit
failures at power stations and resulted in cities being left without power. The
Transmission Group had identified the failure of CT's as one of the greatest threats to
the sustainability and availability of South Africa's power supply and to the
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Transmission business. During 1996 two power transformers had also failed and
burnt to the ground due to the failure ofHV insulation on bushings.
1.5 Cause of failure of Balteau SAX 245 CT
Failure investigations indicated that the rubber thermal expansion membrane on the
top of the unit (bellows), which seals off the oil from the air (the hermetic seal),
perishes in the harsh African conditions over a number of years and moisture enters
the unit. An internal Eskom report [3] concluded that the moisture degrades the HV
insulation, reducing the dielectric strength, resulting in electrical failure and flash over
of the HV voltage to the earthed secondary core shield.
1.6 Problem statement and procedures
1.6.1 The problem statement
An on-line condition monitoring system, High Voltage Insulation Early Warning
System (HVIEWS), has been installed on the Transmission network to try and
eliminate the failures discussed above. The system is intended to trend the insulation
integrity and to suggest maintenance or removal and replacement before the danger
stage.
The problem statement:
In relation to the hermetically sealed insulation in HV plant and the known symptoms
that indicate degradation, the specific parameters generated by the installed on-line
condition monitoring system (HVIEWS) points towards the present condition of the
plant.
1) Does the HVIEWS system track the insulation condition?
2).Does the HVIEWS system alarm the operator to an unhealthy condition of HV
insulation, in time for the operator to take the necessary action to secure the plant
before failure?
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1.6.2 The procedures to be followed
The following procedures are to be followed in order to answers the questions above:
• Trend the failure of hennetically sealed insulation under accelerated degradation
conditions
• Monitor the associated effect on the dissipation factor (tan delta) measurement
and quantify the accuracy of the data in relation to the degraded insulation
condition. This will define the extent to which HVIEWS tracks the failure;
• Detennine the amount of warning time given by the HVIEWS monitoring system
to enable safe removal of the faulty unit from service prior to failure.
1.7 Thesis Layout
The thesis initiates with a review of HV oiVpaper insulation and the characteristics of
the oil and paper which affect the capacitive and the resistive leakage current flow in
the insulation. This highlights the sensitivity of tan delta of oil-paper insulation to the
applied voltage and temperature of the insulation. Chapter 3 then expands the
literature review to summarise what experience utilities have had with on-line
condition monitoring, with particular emphasis on current transfonners. It is noted
that there have been relatively few reports on installed systems and this may be due to
the relatively limited experience of such systems world-wide. Chapter 4 provides an
overview of the techniques used for both the off-~ine and the on-line, relative tan delta
monitoring that were implemented at the Tugela Test Bay. Chapter 5 then describes
the design and layout of the test station which was constructed as part of this research
and highlights the safety and environmental aspects of the design. Chapter 6 then
proceeds to discuss the experimental work carried out at the Tugela Test Bay and the
results achieved. Chapter 7 presents the results of a laboratory based experimental
program that investigated some of the effects observed at the Tugela Test Bay, in
more detail. Chapter 7 also discusses the results obtained from the on-line monitoring
system at sites installed in sub-stations. Chapter 8 presents an assessment of the
findings of all the work (both field and laboratory based) and recommendations for




2.1 Review of insulation used in high voltage current transformers
High Voltage (HV) equipment is the backbone of the Eskom Transmission National
Grid in South Africa. This grid is made up of 135 substations, rated at 400,275,132
and 88kV and interconnected by 26,51Okms of overhead lines, rated at 400, 275 and
132kV [5]. The substation equipment comprises circuit breakers, isolators, busbars,
current transformers (eT's), voltage transformers (VT's) and power transformers. A
















Figure 2.1: Tugela substation layout indicating the 275kV infeeds in
red and the 132kV supplies in green [5].
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The most important component of the RV equipment is the RV insulation, which
enables the equipment to be operated safely, for the total lifetime, in the confined
space available in the substations. CT's, VT's and transformer bushings are mostly
insulated with oil impregnated paper. There are other types of RV insulation, which
may be used for CT's, VT's and transformer bushings. These include gas (SF6, sulfur
hexafluoride) or resins (considered more seriously by Eskom since 2000). The
predominant RV insulation chosen for this equipment, for voltage levels from 11kV
through to 400kV, from the earliest installations (early 1900's), until today, is the oil
impregnated paper combination.
The selection of this oil impregnated paper insulation is the result of years of
experience and research by the RV insulation community world wide, and then finally
the design engineer, responsible for the specific substation must select the most
suitable material for the specific application. The selection must consider the lifelong
electrical, mechanical, chemical, environmental, physical, operational and economic
requirements of the material to meet the primary function of the insulation, namely
"to insulate, i.e. to prevent the flow of electric current between oppositely charged
conductors for the satisfactory operation of the equipment" [6].
This thesis is focussed on the use of an on line relative tan delta measurement system
for the detection of deteriorating oil-paper insulation as used in bushings and CT's.
Tan delta is related to the losses in the insulation and hence issues related to these
losses (particularly what effect moisture content and temperature have on these
losses) as applicable to oil-paper insulation are briefly reviewed. A very thorough
review of the factors affecting the loss tangent of oil-paper composite dielectrics is
provided in Clark [6]. A brief summary of the findings reported in Clark [6] and as
applicable to this thesis are given below.
2.2 The voltage stress distribution
Most commercial dielectrics are normally made up of composite materials such as oil
impregnated paper, which has one dielectric of oil, and in series, the other of paper, or
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similarly for paper and air. If in the oil impregnated paper combination, the paper has
not been thoroughly impregnated then even a third dielectric exists, namely air, which
may exist as a void. Under alternating current (AC) voltage, the electric stress is
permanently distributed across the composite insulation material in a ratio inversely
proportional to the dielectric constants of the materials. Thus when equal thickness of
mineral oil (dielectric constant of 3), and cellulose paper (dielectric constant of 5), are
in series, approximately 72% of the voltage is absorbed by the oil and 28% by the
paper. If an air void (dielectric constant of 1) is present, it absorbs an even greater
voltage stress, and a void or gas pocket has the weakest dielectric strength, of
~3*106V/m as compared to oil which has a dielectric strength of about l2*106V/m
[6]. The normal expansion and contraction of the insulating material under operating
conditions, coupled with the slow absorption of the gas by the oil, tend to reduce the
pressure in the gas and further lower the already poor dielectric strength. Only
sufficient drying and vacuuming of the paper prior to impregnation can reduce the
possibility of voids, and so reduce failures.
2.3 Insulation life
Insulation life is accepted as that period of time during which voltage can be applied
to the insulation under exaggerated service conditions without dielectric breakdown.
Normally this also incorporates exaggerated temperature conditions. Where
mechanical criteria are critical, attention must be placed on tensile strength, creep,
impact strength, elasticity, brittleness etc. Where liquids are used, the problem of
chemical stability becomes most important. Chemical instability results in the
formation of sludge, gases, highly corrosive or highly conductive degradation
products [6]. In the past the most active agents promoting insulation degradation have
been oxygen and temperature and these should be excluded at all costs, these are
normally excluded by hermetically sealing off the insulation.
2.4 Dielectric loss
A perfect insulation, if subjected to voltage, would consume no power. The charging
current under AC voltage, would lead the voltage by 90 degrees. But all solids show
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some degree of conductivity. Only purified gases approach the condition of a perfect
dielectric. The value of dielectric loss varies as a function of the applied voltage and
temperature and frequency. Generally, as the molecular constitution of the dielectric
material departs further and further from that of electrical symmetry, the effects of
temperature, frequency and moisture on the dielectric loss become more pronounced.
The tested value of the dielectric loss of the insulation during the factory manufacture
and the use of the equipment, offers a non-destructive tool for the maintenance of the
insulation. A change in dielectric loss may be due to contamination such as the
absorption of moisture from the air, or degradation of the insulation, which IS
frequently the frontrunner of overheating, ionization and insulation failure [6].
2.5 Dielectric Absorption
Composite dielectrics, when subjected to AC voltages, show a loss which is greater
than may be accounted for by their conductivities. One of the reasons for this is
dielectric absorption. When submitted to a continuous voltage, the charge continues
to flow into the dielectric over a period of time. The dielectric does not give up its
charge instantaneously when shorted out. This charge dissipation requires time. The
dielectric may even accumulate a charge after having been shorted out. This is most
evident in cables, as a period of time is taken to reach a steady value of continuous
current after a DC voltage is applied.
2.6 Dielectric constant
The electrical stress distribution across composite dielectrics is inversely related to the
capacitance of the insulation when subjected to AC voltages. Since the capacitance of
each insulating layer is directly related to the dielectric constant of the material, the
stress distribution for an equal thickness of insulation layers in series is inversely
related to the dielectric constant of the material. Changes in the dielectric constant
require further engineering assessment.
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2.7 Thermal evaluation
It is important to consider the thermal limitations of dielectrics as increases in
temperature may have an impact on the life and serviceability of dielectric material.
Oxidation may occur if the insulation is in contact with air. For temperature increases
of between 8-10°C, it is reported that the rate of oxidation will increase twofold [6].
Also gaseous products are produced which lower voltage ionization and breakdown,
acids are produced, as well as higher loss products and mechanical changes, including
brittleness, loss of tensile strength and shrinkage, leading to voids. The effects of
moisture may also cause chemical reactions resulting in both mechanical and
electrical degradation.
2.8 Drying and impregnation of insulation
All insulating materials absorb moisture. However, to operate at their greatest
dielectric efficiency, this moisture must be removed. All insulation is normally "air
saturated", this needs to be removed and replaced with a liquid of a higher dielectric
strength, for this reason the insulation needs to be thoroughly dried, vacuumed and
impregnated, to enable it to operate effectively. Most high voltage insulation is
vacuum dried at reduced pressures, care must be taken not to damage the insulation
by overheating the organic material, at temperatures above 120°C. Air pockets must
be vacuumed out of the insulation before impregnation as residual air pockets will
form voids. The impregnant must have a low viscosity to enable it to penetrate the
insulation, this low viscosity can only be obtained under high temperature conditions
and the level of the impregnant must be increased slowly into the body of the
insulation, so that the liquefied impregnating material is preceded by an area of
insulation which is saturated by capillary action. A reliable manufacturing process
incorporates (a) the use of the highest practically obtainable vacuum, (b) processes
which eliminate wide temperature variations, (c) the use of temperatures substantially
below the limits imposed by the time/temperature degradation characteristics of the
most sensitive insulation, (d) a drying process which quickly removes the moisture
liberated during the drying cycle,.(e) a process to remove air and moisture from the
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impregnant prior to impregnation, (f) a process to slowly introduce the impregnant to
ensure effective impregnation [6].
2.9 Cellulose and mineral oil used as insulation in HV CT's
Most RV insulation consists of a combination of cellulose and mineral oil and it has
been used successfully up to the higher voltages of 400kV. Commercial cellulose
insulation is manufactured from coniferous woods. The removal of the organic
contaminants such as the pentosans and the lignan is accomplished by boiling the
wood with an alkaline solution of sodium sulfide and sodium hydroxide. The most
common application of cellulose insulation is as paper sheets, pressboards and tapes.
Cellulose is known to be hydrophilic, and has the following defects: (a) high dielectric
constant; (b) reacts with oxygen; and (c) thermally unstable. These defects impose
limitations to the life of the insulation and the equipment. The oil referred to is a light
napthenic hydrocarbon [6].
2.10 Mineral oil impregnated cellulose
RV electrical equipment depends for its usability on the integrity of oil impregnated
cellulose insulation. Wherever high voltage gradients are encountered, engineering
dictates the use of oil-impregnated cellulose. It is best categorized by a usable value
of dielectric loss, electrical and chemical stability and good mechanical properties.
But the progress of this insulation is not free from industrial problems. The inspection
of failures of this insulation has shown misapp1ication, manufacturing defects, and
operating misuse, resulting in electrical breakdown. Oil impregnated cellulose is
subject to serious and frequently rapid degradation if its limitations are not clearly
recognized and controlled. The most serious limitation is its sensitivity to chemical
and dielectric degradation. Experience has shown that the dielectric requires two types
of strength, namely short-term voltage surge application and long-term application of
rated voltage. The short-term strength requires a highly effective manufacturing
process including proper drying and impregnating. The long term withstand ability
depends on : (a) the chemical stability and the products produced by chemical,
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mechanical and dielectric degradation; (b) the dielectric loss increase due to chemical
change and contaminants; and (c) the heat dissipation characteristic [6].
The objective of the drying process is to remove the moisture and thereby decrease
the dielectric loss, but the cellulose is very sensitive to the degrading effects of
temperature. The impregnation process eliminates the presence of air, which effects
the dielectric strength and the dielectric constant. The mechanical aging of cellulose
insulation continues throughout the life of the insulation and normally firstly
manifests itself in chemical changes. In accordance with findings the rate of
mechanical degradation for cellulose insulation, doubles with each increase of 8°C in
operating temperature. The environment also effects the degradation of the insulation
particularly where high humidity and high ambient temperatures are experienced [6].
The exposure to air and moisture is now mostly eliminated by using hermetically
sealed equipment.
The degradation effects of moisture on oil-impregnated cellulose are far more
pronounced than the effects of air. The effect of moisture on oil-impregnated paper is
shown to accelerate the degradation. The removal of moisture by vacuum drying
significantly increases the ability of cellulose to resist degradation. Once initiated, the
chemical changes, which occur in cellulose under conditions conducive to thermal
degradation may result in the formation of water, which then further affects the
stability ofcellulose insulation.
2.11 The change in dielectric constant, dielectric loss and insulation
resistance of cellulose when impregnated with oil
When cellulose paper is impregnated with an insulating liquid, the dielectric constant
is changed to an extent dependent on the dielectric constant of the impregnating liquid
[6]. The presence of air in the dried paper gives an effective dielectric constant
ranging from 1.0 (the dielectric constant for air) to as high as 6.35, which is the
dielectric constant of dry paper. The oil impregnation of the paper results in a
dielectric constant ranging from 2.25 (dielectric constant of mineral oil) to as high as
6.35 When the liquid impregnant has a lower dielectric constant, the dielectric
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constant of the impregnated paper is lower than that of the cellulose, when the
impregnant has a dielectric constant higher than the cellulose, the dielectric constant
of the impregnated paper is higher than that of the cellulose.
The dissipation factor of oil-impregnated paper is increased by an increase in the
density of the paper. This increased power factor may become a problem when drying
the paper as it becomes more difficult to dry as the insulating structure is increased.
With increased density, the dielectric strength increases. This may be used to
advantage in the grading of insulating paper, as the maximum voltage gradient is
found in the insulation adjacent to the copper conductor. Dense insulating paper, with
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Figure 2.4: The relationship of paper density and power factor of vacuum dried and
impregnated paper [6].
The insulation resistance of oil-impregnated paper is influenced by many factors
including the effectiveness of the drying. This is essential in obtaining the highest
insulation resistance values. Highly viscous impregnating oils result in an increase of
the insulation resistance. The resistance of oil impregnated paper decreases with an
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Figure 2.5: The effect of temperature on the dc resistance of vacuum dried and oil
impregnated paper [6].
The problem of ionization and corona formation, leading to dielectric breakdown, is
most generally manifested by a carbonized area, with undeniable evidence of
localized overheating. From this standpoint, dielectric failures may be ascribed to
thermal causes. This is later manifested as an electrical discharge designated as
corona, formed at rated voltage, when left to run unchecked, leads to localized heating
and failure. The term ionization refers to the combined effects of a phenomenon
which leads to an initial increase in the dielectric loss. As the voltage is slowly
increased from zero there is initially no form of electrical discharge. As the voltage is
increased, the ionization phenomenon merges into a type of glow discharge that is
designated as corona.
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2.12 Dielectric changes in oil impregnated cellulose insulation
caused by aging
The dielectric strength of paper-oil combination remains practically unchanged up to
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Figure 2.6: The effect of temperature on vacuum dried oil impregnated paper
insulation [6].
The power factor characteristic of oil impregnated cellulose remains constant at rated
voltage, but if the applied voltage is increased by 66% above the rated voltage and the
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Figure 2.8: The increase in power factor at lOOoe as a function of time at
166% rated voltage [6].
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 clearly show the increase in the dielectric loss of oil impregnated
cellulose as gauged by the power factor value when subjected to 166% of rated
voltage at 25°e and 100°e. At 25° e, there is a rapid increase after 15 weeks. At
100°c, the increase is somewhat slower but the power factor magnitude starts at a
higher level [6].
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2.13 Power Factor of oil-paper insulation.
The power factor (cos ~) or the dissipation factor (tan 8) is a measure of the power
loss in the insulating material and therefore a general indication of the quality of the
dielectric. A simple model of a stressed dielectric is shown in Figure 2.9 below. The
power factor of mineral oil is a good tool for evaluating the efficiency of the dielectric
and a sensitive test for evaluating the dielectric degradation. It responds quickly to the
presence of contaminating materials, picked up by the oil during improper
manufacture or use. The power factor test will indicate the presence of soluble
varnishes, resins, moisture and will also indicate degradation due to oxidization in the
oil. The direct effect of an increase in power factor is increased heating. The indirect
effects of an increase in power factor are: (a) increased metallic corrosion; (b)
increased mechanical and electrical insulation degradation; (c) increased water
solubility; and (d) increased oxidation. In sealed units, the hazards experienced from




Figure 2.9: Circuit diagram showing current flow in a typical dielectric insulation
The power factor of an insulation is the ratio = Loss in dielectric (Watts)/apparent
power (volt-amperes).
pp = W/VA
The power factor of new refined insulating oil is extremely low, less than 0.001 when
tested at 50Hz and at 100 QC. When power is applied across a perfect dielectric, there
is no loss. The power factor is therefore zero when there is an induced capacitance
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current (le) which is 90 QC ahead of the voltage (E). But a perfect dielectric does not
exist, every dielectric posses a degree of conductivity when subjected to AC or DC
voltage, this current (le) is very small and in phase with the applied voltage (E). The
vector sum of the two currents (It) leads the voltage by less than 90 degree as shown
in figure 1.4.3 below. The cosine of the angle ~ by which the current (It) leads the
voltage (E) is the power factor of the dielectric. The angle 8 (90-~) is designated as






Figure 2.10: The vector relationship of voltage and current in a dielectric system.
The measurement of the power factor of a dielectric is made at low voltage and low
frequency by means of an AC bridge. At voltages up to lOkV and frequencies up to
10 kilocycles per second, a Schering bridge is used.
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2.14 Summary
Oil impregnated paper composite insulation has proved over 100 years to be very
successful as an insulation medium for HV apparatus. A thorough understanding of
the characteristics and the influence the operating, the environment, and the aging
regimes is necessary prior to application. There are always losses through the
insulation when subjected to an AC voltage, it is important to ensure these losses are
maintained at the lowest possible values, by precise manufacturing (drying and
impregnating), and during operation (reducing exposure to high temperatures, oxygen
and moisture). The effect of any of these extreme conditions will result in the increase
of the losses and increase the internal heating until destruction takes place. Tan ()
testing is a relatively easy way of ensuring the satisfactory condition of operational
insulation. However an on-line tan delta condition monitoring system would need to
ensure that detected changes in tan delta on a specific unit are not due to normal
external variations caused by ambient and/or load correlated temperature variations.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF RESEARCH INTO ON-LINE DIAGNOSTIC AND
MONITORING TECHNIQUES FOR IN SERVICE HIGH
VOLTAGE INSULATION.
Off-line techniques have been implemented by utilities for the monitoring of high
voltage equipment over many decades [27]. Overall experience with these off-line
systems is not reviewed but the more recent developments of using on-line techniques
is reviewed below. Included is a review of the work performed by the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPR!) on evaluating the practical use of such on-line systems to
detect developing faults in CT's and bushings.
3.1 Review of worldwide techniques
New diagnostic and monitoring techniques were developed within the Queensland
Electricity Commission of Australia for use on HV in service plant [8]. The drivers
for the implementation of this on-line system was a high failure rate of instrument
transformers and transformer bushings, causing serious explosions, damage to nearby
equipment, oil fires, safety of staff, and high costs. Conventional off-line tests are
costly, labour intensive, require plant isolations. A dielectric dissipation factor (DDF)
device was developed for use in an existing instrument transformer test device
(ITTD).
The device is portable and uses hydraulics to raise a high voltage capacitive probe to
make contact with the busbar feeding power to the bushing under test. This allows the
leakage current flowing through the probe to be compared to the leakage current from
the bushing. The system incorporates matched transducers ("Caplinks") for signal
conditioning, phase encoders to convert the signal to a digital output, and the DDF
resolver, which compares zero crossings between the incoming signals and displays
the results.
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The system has been used in laboratory and field applications. Some faulty field units
have been detected and when removed from service off-line testing reportedly
confirmed the results. Laboratory comparative testing against a conventional bridge
indicated a high rate of accuracy [8].
A permanent system was installed on a 275kV set of CT's and bushings [9]. The
system is reportedly performing well, but atmospheric influences are being
considered. This system also makes use of the leakage current flowing through the
insulation and compares this to a reference voltage. Any variation is further
investigated by using off-line techniques to confirm the findings. The basic principle
of operation of this system is similar to the monitoring system used as the basis of this
thesis (High Voltage Insulation Early Warning System -HVIEWS), but using
different software and logic to determine the condition of the insulation relative to the
known healthy condition of a similar device. Of importance to this thesis are the
problems being experienced with the HVIEWS system are manifesting themselves
with this system as well, as the future direction includes, "the development of
software for the continuous DDF system to recognise and ignore changes due to
influences such as heavy rain and system glitches, as well as the inclusion of
temperature compensation into DDF measurements" [9].
Vujovic and Fricker [10] report on the development of a continuous on-line tan cS
monitoring system was developed in South Africa. This is the HVIEWS system which
was used as the basis for the research presented in this dissertation. The system is
based on the comparison of tan cS values and trends of units being monitored at a
particular time and the comparison of these measured values against historical data.
Diagnosis is based on identifying HV insulation with abnormal changes and
comparing these with similar units being measured. Relative measurements reduce the
influence of ambient temperatures, operating voltages, loading, ageing, different
designs and operating conditions.
A high voltage CT was initially compared to a gas capacitor and the relative results
indicated the absolute tan cS increase of the CT over the period 8hOO at 16C until
12hOO when the temperature had increased to 24°C. As the ambient temperature
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increased so did the tan b of the CT from 0.55% to 0.62%. When two CT's were,
compared against each other, the relative tan b result was lower at 0.16% without any
increase when the ambient temperature increased.
The system was installed on 95 x 275kV and 88kV bushings and CT's, in the
Fordsburg substation in Johannesburg. Trends and patterns indicate variables to be
considered such as loading differences, low loads on weekends, as well as reduced
fluctuations in the relative tan b when loadings and load patterns are similar. Absolute
tan b may also be measured if a reference gas capacitor is installed on the substation
busbar. This particular system was the origin of both the SOS system [14] and the
HVIEWS system [10].
At the end of 1998 the Beijing Power Supply Bureau had installed 9 on-line systems
in one 500kV and eight 220kV substations monitoring 890 capacitive types of
insulation on HV equipment [11]. The system makes use of absolute values of tan b
by comparing the phase angles of (a) the leakage current through the insulation,
processed through a current transducer, filtering and converted to digital signals and
(b) the running voltage at the busbar.
Analysis of the data indicated that as the temperature in the substation increased, so
the tan b values of the plant became unreliable (increased beyond the permitted
limits), although the voltage, frequency, leakage current, and capacitance remained
stable. In depth investigation revealed that the current transducers became inaccurate
as the ambient temperature changed. Historical data taken over the previous 2 years
was used to compare data from the exact dates from the previous 2 years to the
present day's data to see if the same trends were present. This filtering of the data
reportedly brought credibility back to the data, showing that the previous data was
similar to the present data. Through the use of this filtering of the historic data, 8 units
were identified over a two year period, as having faulty insulation and were removed
from the system, preventing serious system faults. Off line testing confirmed that the
insulation was faulty.
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This absolute tan () on-line monitoring system proved to be successful since the
temperature fluctuation problem on the transducers has been eliminated by the filtering
of the trended data [11].
The short comings of other on-line monitoring systems which make use of system
voltage and leakage current (PT method) to determine the absolute tan () value of the
insulation include phase angle shift on the secondary of the PT, temperature, rainfall
and humidity. There is a tendency to ignore (filter) the data when these conditions
manifest themselves, which can result in a failure going undetected. The alternative is
the Synthetic Relative Measuring Method (SRM method) [12]. This method uses a
relative comparison system which compares the leakage current of the insulation of
one device to at least two but possibly even more other devices. This method allows
for the easy detection of a faulty unit, as when discrepancies arise between item 1 and
3 and between 1 and 2, but not between item 2 and 3 then the fault exists in unit 1.
Using this method it eliminates the interference from weather, rain, temperature,
humidity, voltage as all units are subject to the same external influences. The system
has been installed on plant in Yinchuan Power Bureau, China, and many years of
experience have been successful. Comparisons between on line and off line methods
show a very good correlation [12].
Research was conducted on a 230kV CT at Manitoba Hydro's Dorsey substation in
Canada [13]. Wang et al [13] list the reason for the research work as the short
comings in: a) the periodic monitoring of insulation condition of HV apparatus, using
laboratory established techniques; b) the need to remove equipment from service for
these tests; c) possibly interrupting supply or d) missing the dielectric changes due to
long periods between consecutive tests. Other problems experienced by Manitoba
Hydro include the short comings of the existing on line-systems, namely: (a) the
inaccuracies of the absolute monitoring system caused by connecting cables, phase
angle error of the potential transformer and capacitive linkage with phases not
involved in the measurement; b) the relative tan delta system needing to match
Caplink units so the phase shift of the applied voltage can be neglected and c) the
inaccuracies introduced in the sum current method by the influence of ambient
temperature, humidity and system conditions.
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This digital technique discussed by Wang et al [13] is based on the discrete Fourier
transform being performed on the analog voltage and current system, these results are
passed through a software analysis package to implement digital computation of
dissipation factor and capacitance to produce accurate results, verified by off line
laboratory tests. The digital computation simulation accounts for errors due to
synchronisation of the sampling rate, effects of harmonics and sampling rate
fluctuations, by adjusting the trigger point of the measurement. The laboratory tests
confirm that the measurement precision of this developed method is 0.05% for
dissipation factor [13].
The SOS tan 8 on line monitoring system for transformer bushings was installed on
69 bushings at Deserset Power Plant in Utah [14]. Bonanza Unit 1 at the station was
cited as the best performing power plant in the USA in 2001, based on a capacity
factor of97.66%. Difficulties were being experienced to get outages to test plant off-
line, forced outages were costly to customers and bottom line. A risk management
plan identified minimizing unscheduled down time on RV plant as key to improving
service to customers. The RV bushings had a record of failures, they were aging and
the resulting failures would lead to long down times. On-line testing was identified as
the only viable option. This would have the added benefit of reducing the time taken
by staff to do off-line testing. Discussion with manufacturers resulted in identification
of the SOS tan 8 system for bushings.
The system makes use of on line equipment and the principle of the measurement of
the magnitude and phase of the leakage current flowing to earth through one unit
compared to the leakage current flowing through similar units in the same substation.
This measurement results in a relative tan 8, which is achieved by trending the
leakage current flowing through the insulation of the bushings (caused by the losses in
the insulation). The signal is compared to a reference voltage from another adjacent
unit. Differential results are quantified into an insulation condition, namely good,
alarm condition or bad. The signals are also processed to calculate capacitance and
dissipation factors.
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The system is cost justified on the basis of reduced maintenance and the reduction of
maintenance down time, the safety aspect has been cited as justification alone. After
four months of operation, the system is gaining confidence amongst the operators who
monitored it daily are now monitoring it weekly as the alarming function is gaining
trust. No mention is made of the environmental impact on the system. This system
operates on a similar principle to the HVIEWS system [14].
3.2 A review of research into the prediction and prevention of the
failure of HV eT's and bushings
During the late 1990's the Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, in the USA,
undertook research to identify key parameters indicative of condition and impeding
failure of oil filled high voltage CT's and bushings [34]. The focus of this effort was
to develop mitigation techniques to reduce the catastrophic transformer failures. The
background to this research was the numerous explosions of CT's and bushings that
were experienced by many utilities. The failures of oil filled bushings internal to large
transformers have caused many catastrophic transformer failures and financial
consequences in the order of several million dollars. HV CT's and bushings are
similar in their insulation structures and therefore experience similar failure modes.
EPRI initiated a project to age HV CT's and bushings to failure in the laboratory
while monitoring various parameters. The tests were designed to age the insulation at
an accelerated rate. This was done by energising the equipment at higher than rated
voltage, thermally cycling the insulation, in some cases applying high voltage
impulses and/or introducing moisture to the insulation structure. After failure of the
test unit, a forensic analysis of the insulation was undertaken to determine the failure
mode.
3.2.1 Powertech Labs Inc. tested 8 CT's and 4 of these failed. The CT's were
subjected to voltages of up to 2.1 p.u. or 650kV, and subjected to rated
primary current [15].
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eT Hours Under Indications eT Dissection
Number test
1 10500 No indication of failure
2 10500 No indication of failure
3 5400 No indication of failure
4 5400 No indication of failure
5 3400 (Failed) Power factor increased PD started at edges of
days prior to failure from graded layer paper, causing
0.5 to 2, mcreases m tracking from layer to
Hydrogen (967 - 8556), layer.
Methane increase (126-
969), Ethane increase (21 -
83)
6 72 (Failed) Power factor increased 0.3 Hole m top centre of
- 1.5, hydrogen increased insulation caused by
overheating.
7 4100 (Failed) Power Factor increased 0.5 Not dissected
-4
8 10 (Failed) PD increased, Power factor Not dissected
increased 4 - 6.
Table 3.1: Results of accelerated agmg tests on HV CT's undertaken by Powertech
Labs Inc. [15]
Results showed that power factor was a very good indicator of impending failure.
Partial discharge (PD) and DGA gave some warning but were found unreliable in this
investigation [15].
3.2.2 Bonneville Power tested 7 CT's and 5 of these failed. Tests were conducted by
starting the 60Hz voltage at 350kV and increasing by 25kV a week. Current
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was back-energized via the secondary cores to give rated current flow in the
CT primary [16].
Monitor CTl CT2 CT3 CT4 CT5
Relative TanD 10min 7hrs None 18min 9 hrs
Cap ratio 8min 7hrs None 45min 32hrs
Acoustic PD Ihr None None none 25hrs
Leakage None 5hrs None 46min 34hrs
Current
Electrical PD N/A N/A N/A N/A 52hrs
Gas in oil None None N/A N/A N/A
Temp None None None None None
Time to 40hrs 5days 58days 28days 41days
failure
kV at failure 350 350 575 500 525
Table 3.2: Results of accelerated aging tests of RV CT's undertaken by Bonneville
Power, indicating imminent failure warning time. [16]
The dissection of CT 1 and 2 indicated the evidence of partial discharge between the
grounded shield that houses the secondary cores and the feed through conductor, with
voids in the paper insulation wrapped around the doughnut. Overheating of the
secondary cores was also observed. Results indicated that no monitoring technique
will catch all types of failures, relative tan delta and capacitance ratio show the most
promise for detecting imminent failure [16].
3.2.3 American Electric Power Service Corporation tested 3 CT's and 1 failed, the
CT's were supplied with half rated current and test voltage of 200kV for four
months, then the voltage was increased to 220kV for four months, then again
increased to 250kV after one month, when the unit failed [17]. After
dissection, the failure mode was determined to be localized overstressing of
the oil between paper insulation layers. This stress breaks down the oil and
forms X wax as a byproduct of the small partial discharges. Once the X wax
forms in sufficient quantities, it prevents liquid oil from impregnating the area,
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the insulating paper becomes dry and dielectrically weak and then punctures.
The most effective method of predicting failure was found to be a hydrogen-
monitoring device [17]
3.2.4 NEETRAC tested 5 BV transformer bushings at EPRI laboratories and failed
all 5 bushings over a period of 18 months [18]. The bushings were supplied
with rated voltage which was stepped up 25% per week up to 2.3 times rated
voltage, the original bushing current transformers were back fed to circulate
rated current in the bushings. Four bushings failed in the same mode, which
was due to the heat from the current transformers, the dissection indicated a
hole burnt through the insulation at the level of the CT's. The early indicator
of failure was tan delta, increasing 2 - 3% from 2 weeks before failure, which
is an indicator that many layers are degrading. At this point the back feeding
of the current transformers was switched off to with twice rated voltage
applied. Periodic voltage spikes were applied to the energised bushing. The
final failure was caused by insulation breakdown due to voltage stress and was
detected by acoustic and electrical PD increasing by 2000pC, 30 days before
failure [18]. The summarized findings of the EPRI research project [19]
concluded that:
• BV CT's have a low failure rate, but most fail catastrophically. The failure rate for
surveyed utilities was 0.2% per annum.
• Most BV CT failures occur in summer peak loading, indicating thermal runaway
as the commonly identified failure mode. Other failure causes include moisture
ingress, X wax build up, switching transients, poor workmanship, and poor
designs.
• Periodic off line gas in oil testing is a useful indication of insulation degradation.
• The most effective parameters to monitor on line are partial discharge and
dissipation factor.
• BV CT monitoring systems cost up to 25% of the cost ofthe CT.
3.3 Summary
There is little experience that has been a obtained and reported on in the interpretation
of data gathered from on-line tan delta monitoring systems. There is evidence that the
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reliability of the system needs to be carefully assessed prior to installation with
particular reference to the impact of climatic parameters (rain, high humidity) have on
the tan delta measurements reported back to a central monitoring point.
Laboratory investigations undertaken to deliberately fail CT's have indicated that
quite significant overstressing is required in order to fail a CT from a healthy
condition. Another technique that was initially adopted for this research project was to
back energize the CT secondary windings. This technique created failures in every
instance in other investigations.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TEST METHODS AND TEST EQUIPMENT USED
4.1 The operational experience gained in the monitoring of
paper/oil insulation from a population of operational CT's.
There are various methods of testing HV insulation to evaluate the integrity thereof
for operational use. These include the following methods:
Table 4.1: The sUItabIhty ofvanous methods ofHV testmg in the field .
Test method Advantages Disadvantages





Off line Power factor/ loss Advanced technology, Plant must be removed
tangent widely employed. from service
Partial discharge Very sensitive test. Due to interference m
Results are conclusive. HV environment, this
test is best suited to a
test laboratory
Hi Pot Easy to perform test High voltage could
induce failure
Dissolved gas analysis Very sensitive test. Plant must be removed
Results are conclusive. from servIce to take
sample.
On line, continuous tan delta Plant does not have to be Technology still m its





From the above table, it can be seen that a number of different test methods can be
used to establish the integrity of the HV insulation. A brief discussion of some of the
available techniques is included in order to highlight some of the practical problems
that have been experienced with off-line testing.
4.1.1 The electrical resistance test of insulation is widely used and serves as a basis
for more sophisticated tests. This test is used in all field testing of HV
insulation. Decreasing resistance values indicates deteriorating insulation. Test
results must be adjusted back to standard temperature conditions and
insulation age. Results are best evaluated when compared to previous results
and trends are established. The test is performed with a portable, battery
powered Meggar™ insulation tester, which can supply various voltage
magnitudes in the range from 200V to 5kV DC applied between the conductor
and the earthed housing, across the insulation. The instrument measures the
current and the result is supplied in a range of Ohm values from one Ohm, 1Q,
to a number of Gigohms. A high resistance reading indicates the integrity of
healthy insulation.
4.1.2 Off-line tan delta testing is a mature technology, which is regularly applied by
utilities worldwide to measure insulation losses. As indicated in Figure 2.8 and
2.9 above, the power factor ( Cos ~) or the dissipation factor (tan 0) is a
measure of the power loss in the insulation material, and therefore a general
indication of the quality thereof. There are a number of instruments in
commercial operation. Most make use of the balanced bridge measuring
method. These instruments are reasonably priced and so are readily available
for testing. These instruments are generally portable, easy to set up in a high
voltage substation, compensate for temperature changes or various levels of
humidity. These units operate on different voltages or frequencies, depending
on the manufacturer. Different makes require the item under test to be
disconnected from any other conductors or devices. This becomes a
cumbersome task in the operational arena and for this reason testing is carried
out very seldom. The target is to test each item only every 3 to 6 years. A
rapidly developing fault will not be captured and prevented, during these large
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intervals. This off-line tan delta testing is the HV test most frequently used to
measure insulation in the field within Eskom.
4.1.3 Partial discharge testing is conducted by applying a high test voltage to the
device to be tested and then monitoring any discharges in the body of the
insulation by sensing these discharges either acoustically or electrically.
Should the discharge magnitude exceed the insulation limit, then the device
would not be suitable for operation. This test method, when applied in a HV
substation, may measure discharges from other devices. These discharges may
interfere with the discharge from the device under test, resulting in inaccurate
results. The background noise affects the sensitivity of the test results, so that
this test should preferably be performed in a noise free laboratory. Although
this test is extremely useful and sensitive it is normally only performed on new
devices, prior to installation and on suspect or refurbished devices. The cost of
removing a CT or bushing from the field to have it partial discharge tested in a
laboratory is extremely high, so this test is seldom performed on in-service
equipment.
4.1.4 High potential (Hi Pot) testing
The test equipment used for this testing is normally a high voltage DC source,
which is portable and moved around to different sites on a truck. The unit is
very costly and so not readily available, and on site testing requires
considerable organization. The test method uses high voltages and these are
applied to the unit under test. The leakage current to earth is measured. The
high test voltage, which is normally above the rated voltage of the unit under
test, may damage the test object. This test is seldom applied in the operational
arena and only used for special cases where the consequences of poor HV
insulation have a high risk attached. This is not generally used for routine
testing.
4.1.5 Dissolved Gas Analysis
Dissolved gas analysis (DGA) is performed on mineral insulating oil. A
sample of the oil is drawn from the insulation to be tested. The sample volume
is normally 100ml. The container holding the sample is taken to a laboratory
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for analysis. The sample is prepared for testing and the headspace gas just
above the liquid is sampled. An analysis is done on the relevant gases found.
The presence of certain gases at levels above the accepted normative values
(given in Table 4.2 below) indicates different insulation degradation
conditions.
Regular samples of the impregnating oil can be taken from the HV equipment
and can be sent for dissolved gas analysis. Care must be taken not to reduce
critical pressures, nor to introduce contaminants. Increases in the levels of
various gases indicate increasing degradation.








Table 4.2: Table mdlcatmg the gas concentrations in insulating oil in transformer
bushings considered normal [7].
Abnormal levels of specific gases maybe interpreted to be associated with specific
fault mechanisms. These are indicated in Table 4.3 below.
Abnormal level of gas Interpretation





Carbon monoxide Severe overloading
Table 4.3: The type of degradatIon takmg place III the insulation due to
excessive amounts ofthe relevant gas found in the sample. [23].
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Sampling of the oil was undertaken on a part the population of Eskom CT's
(see Table 1.1) during the late 1980's and early 1990's. This sampling was
. later thought to have possibly contributed to the high levels of failure seen in
the CT's over this period. The failures were later attributed to the opening of
the CT's for sampling and the ingress of oxygen and moisture during this
sampling, coupled with the fact that seals were not restored to their original
integrity. Sampling of oil was stopped in the 1990's and was only began again
in 1999, on a certain population of transfonner bushings which are indicating
high levels of gassing. DGA sampling of the oil is no longer considered a low
risk test method of detennining the quality of insulation on CT's and
transfonner bushings and is only applied in special cases by highly skilled
staff.
4.1.6 On-line continuous tan delta monitoring
On-line continuous tan delta monitoring is a method of detennining the
integrity of the HV insulation that had never been undertaken in an outdoor
situation in RSA. Research had, however, been undertaken in the USA [15]
and at the laboratory of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) in South Africa [10]. The CSIR research had expanded to an indoor
substation, where CT's were monitored [20,21]. This dissertation will expand
on research undertaken to establish the accuracy of one such on line tan delta
monitoring system, HVIEWS.
4.2 Off-line tan 8 techniques utilised
As part of this research required comparisons to be made between the on-line and an
off-line system, the off-line system utilized in this research is discussed below.
The major off line tan delta test set used during this research is the Circuit System
Design (CSD) unit. The unit used was the CSD Model Type: LAB, Serial Number:
103293-12-01. This is a portable, self contained, instrument, capable of measuring
accurately (these limits are discussed in more detail below) the loss tangent and
capacitance of items of distribution equipment, particularly condenser bushings, to
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enable engineers to make rapid tests as part of routine maintenance. This unit belongs
to the Transmission Depot at Pinetown and has been used as the only type of test set
to test the HV bushings and CT's in Kwa Zulu Natal Transmission Grid. Whilst the
CSD system is discussed in some detail, use was also made in this work of the
DOBLE M4000 tan delta measurement system [24]. The major difference between
the two units (the CSD and the DOBLE M4000 systems) is that the DOBLE M4000
operates with a variable test voltage (0-12kV rms) whereas the CSD operates at a
fixed voltage of 600 Vrms.
4.2.1 CSD background information.
Oil impregnated insulation systems as used in bushings and current transformers have
typical loss tangents of 0.005, which should be measured to an accuracy of 5% or
better if meaningful comparisons are to be made between different CT's. The CSD
bridge has a quoted accuracy that exceeds this requirement. The in-situ measurement
of the bushing or CT is made between a tapping point connected to the grading foil
immediately inside the outermost (earthed) foil and the helmet (live end). The
capacitance between the tapping point and earth is approximately 50 times that of the
bushing itself (about 25000pF and 700pF respectively).
4.2.2 Accuracy of measurement.
The CSD loss tangent bridge can measure loss tangents with a resolution of 5*10-5
and an accuracy of better than 1% for loss tangents greater than 0.005. Loss tangents
of up to 0.1 can be measured. There are three capacitance ranges 0 to 1000pF, 0 to
10000pF, and 0 to O.lmicroF with a resolution of 0.05pf on the lowest range. The
operating frequency of 79.58Hz is used because it is close to the power frequency but
allows for rejection of power frequency interference in the bridge detector circuits. A
frequency above 50Hz allows greater sensitivity of the bridge and improvement of the
loss tangent discrimination.
The operating principle and circuit diagram of the unit may be found in Appendix 2.
4.2.3 Operational experience of the CSD tan Delta test set.
The Transmission Grid in KwaZu1u-Nata1 has 4 CSD units in operation. These units
are used to test all the HV transformer bushings and CT's in the area. These comprise
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about 300 bushings and about 700 CT's, and the test sets have been in service since
1993, each CT and bushing requiring testing every 3 years.
The Grid uses absolute values as a guideline, to indicate the serviceability of the RV
insulation, should the measured value exceed the guideline value the unit is removed
from service.
Plant Item Maximum Absolute Tan Delta Value
CT 0.5%
Bushing 1%
Table 4.4: The maximum allowable tan delta value for plant III servIce [27].
Bushings and CT's tan delta values are also compared amongst the three units on the
three phases of the plant on which they are situated. Should the measured tan delta
value of any unit vary by more than 30% (i.e. either 30% higher or 30% lower) when
compared to the other units, the differing unit is removed and replaced with a new
unit [27].
The determined capacitance value is compared to the capacitance value on the name
plate of the CT or bushing and any deviation of more than 10% is considered as cause
to remove the unit from service for further tests [27].
The CSD test set was used to test 6 CT's and the results of these tests were compared
to similar tests performed on the same 6 CT's using a 10kV Doble test set.
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CT Serial Capacitance Capacitance % Tan delta % Tan delta 0/0
Number. in pF Doble in pFCSD Doble CSD Difference
10kV 650V 10kV 650V
54678/17 656.38 653.75 0.682 0.425 38
54679/18 684.25 682.5 0.404 0.210 48
54679/13 660.13 658.7 0.352 0.210 40
403 709.67 709.11 0.294 0.183 38
404 754.65 753.07 0.274 0.172 37
414 746.16 745.46 0.322 0.205 37
Average 701.87 708.43 0.388 0.234 39
Standard 42.26 42.699 0.151 0.095 4.227
deviation
Table 4.5: The similarities III the capacItance values and the 39% average dIfference
in the % tan delta values of 6 CT's when tested with the CSD 650V tester and the
Doble 10kV tester. [25]
4.3 The continuous on-line relative tan () system
The continuous on-line relative tan () system utilized in this research is the
commercial system marketed under the name HVIEWS. This system and its operating
principle is briefly reviewed.
4.3.1 System overview
The HVIEWS system is a continuous, on line insulation monitoring system for CT's
and Bushings. The system monitors the insulation integrity of the devices by
measuring the internal leakage current and calculates the tan () of a unit as a relative
value compared with a reference voltage from another unit that it is grouped with.
Since the system uses relative measurements, there is a minimum of three units to be
grouped for each phase of evaluation. Tan () is a measure of dielectric losses, which
are caused by the capacitive leakage current in the dielectric material used to make a
bushing core or CT insulation and are generated within the paper insulation of the
core. One of the symptoms of insulation deterioration is its increased sensitivity to
changes in temperature and voltage, which manifests itself in the form of increased
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dielectric losses. A relative tan delta value IS calculated for each device being
monitored.
The relative tan delta values are then trended over 28 days and compared to the values
stored from the original 28 days. Any increasing deviation is indicated on a condition
report. When the deviation reaches a certain set level then the plant condition is
alarmed and a healthy condition (green) changes to an alarm condition (yellow), if the
condition continues to deteriorate then a danger condition (red) is reached at which
time the plant should be removed from service. Plant cannot be left in service at this
stage, as the risk of failure in service and the chance of damage or danger to staff,
cannot be tolerated.
Tan () and capacitance are properties of the bushing/eT design and the dielectric
material used in the design. Monitoring and measurement of the tan 8 gives an
indication of the quality of insulation and its sensitivity to temperature and voltage
changes.
The HVIEWS system components are discussed in detail in the operating manual of
the system [26]. A brief description of each component is given below.
4.3.2 Outdoor equipment
The function of the outdoor yard equipment is to provide a voltage signal to the
indoor cubicle which is representative of the internal leakage current of the device
being monitored. It comprises of the tapping units, cabling, signal conditioning and
junction boxes.
4.3.3 Indoor equipment
The function of the indoor equipment is to digitize the appropriate internal leakage
current signals and to compute the insulation condition of the devices. This data is
stored to a database locally and exported to a central database.
Alarms are generated for certain conditions when these conditions are exceeded.
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4.3.4 Remote database
The remote database is where all historic information IS stored and where
daily/monthly reports are generated.
4.3.5 System software
The system is based on the principal of the measurement of the phase angle and
magnitude of the leakage current flowing to earth in several units. Software is then
used to derive a relative tan 8 measurement of the insulation. The system has been
optimized using software with minimal hardware. The deterioration of the insulation
is gauged by its sensitivity to changes in the on line operating conditions. The
versatility of the system installed at substations allows for continuous accumulation of
data.
The signals are sampled and the data processed to calculate the capacitance and
dissipation factor changes. Since a second unit of equipment is used as a reference
instead of a standard capacitor, the values are relative to that unit. The principle is
extended to several units within the substation.
With specific configurations, relative measurements eliminate common mode effects,
such as ambient temperature, operating voltages and load conditions and accentuate
the differences, such as design and sensitivity to changes in insulation. [14].
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Figure 4.1: Overview ofthe total HVIEWS System [26].
4.3.6 Comparison of on-line and off-line techniques utilized
Table 4.7 below is a comparison of the on-line and the off-line techniques reviewed.
The benefits and disadvantages ofeach technique are highlighted in this table.
43
On-line technique (HVIEWS) Off-line techniques (CSD and Doble
M4000)
• On line continuous measurements no • Periodic, off line 3 yearly outage
outage required except at installation required to perform tests, necessary to
disconnect droppers
• Tan 8 measurement relative to other • Absolute measurement of tan 8
unit in same set
• No compensation needed for ambient • Temperature compensation to be
temperature, loading and voltage levels applied
on similar units
• Relative measurement between • Measurement made on Schering
several units bridge principle
• Changing insulation condition takes • Insulation condition measured
time to filter through software to results instantaneously
• Measurements and recording of • Measurement and recording of
condition is automated condition must be undertaken manually
• Measurement influenced negatively • Measurement not influenced
by environmental conditions e.g. negatively by environmental conditions
insulation condition and rain, e.g. insulation condition and rain,
• Unit installation is permanent • Unit is light and portable
• Compares measurements to historic • Does not compare measurements to
values automatically historic values
• Operates at system voltage • Operates at reduced voltage (eg 650
Vrms or up to 12 kVrms)
Table 4.7: companng the attnbutes of the HVIEWS umt, the CSD unit and the Dob1e
unit.
In 1995 and 1996 at Eskom's Mersey substation, two separate incidents occurred
where current transformers faulted and plant was damaged, resulting in the loss of
supply to large industrial power users. At this time Eskom transmission and the CSIR
installed a pilot test site at Mersey substation to evaluate the on line monitoring
system in an outdoor substation [23]. The installation of the system in the harsh
outdoor environment was very difficult as this had not been done previously and
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many customized parts, fittings and installation methods had to be produced for the
first time. The CT's were insulated by lifting them with a crane and slipping a layer of
insulating material between the CT base and the metal equipment support. Many
problems were experienced with moisture bridging the insulation during the rain
season and possibly periods of very high relative humidity. Approximately 40 units
were monitored at Mersey. These included transformer bushings and current
transformers.
The system detected a current transformer which appeared to be failing and the
conservative approach agreed on was to remove the unit from service and send it for
laboratory tests. The off line 10kV tan delta test was not conclusive, but partial
discharge tests 300pC showed the unit to be well above the acceptable level of 10pC
[23]. The Mersey test site had proved that it was possible to successfully monitor
outdoor plant.
4.3.7 Extension of the on-line tan delta system to other Transmission substations.
During 1996 two current transformers failed at Impala substation, resulting in load
losses to a large municipality and two major industrial customers and damage inside
the substation.
The CSIR's on line tan delta monitoring system was purchased from the CSIR and
installed by Eskom personnel at Impala substation. Many of the problems experienced
at Mersey substation were improved upon, and in the place of the original insulation,
insulators were manufactured out of resin and installed. Cabling was installed in the
underground cable trenches and permanent power supplies were arranged for the
monitoring system. These were some of the issues, which had caused problems at
Mersey. A total of42 units are being monitored at Impala.
In 1997, a current transformer at Illovo substation failed and caused a power supply
outage to industrial customers. Due to the strategic nature of the customers supplied
from Illovo, petrol refineries, motor car manufacturers and paper manufacturers, and
the impact of a current transformer failing and interrupting the supply, the on line tan
delta system was extended to Illovo. The HVIEWS system was installed at Illovo
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substation in 1998. This new system improved on prevIOus failure areas of the
original system. Thirty three units are being monitored at Illovo.
The pilot site at Mersey was upgraded by the vendor to incorporate the latest
installation methods and equipment. This was done in 1999 and 105 units are being
monitored at Mersey.
4.3.8 Extension of the on-line tan delta system to Generation stations DV plant.
In 1998 failures of current transformers in two high voltage yards of two different
power stations caused multiple generator tripping and extensive financial losses to the
power stations. These customers were demanding that Eskom Transmission take some
action to provide assurance that the RV plant was operationally safe. This pressure
resulted in the on line tan delta monitoring system being expanded into the power
station's HV equipment.
Table 4.6: SItes where HVIEWS IS Installed:
Site Voltage Level Year installed
Impala 275 kV 1998
Illovo 275 kV 1998









The installations described above provided condition monitoring of about 800 devices
at a capital cost ofR4M or R5000 per device or 3,3% of capital cost.
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4.3.9 Field maintenance of insulation
The objective behind the field maintenance of RV equipment is to ensure the plant is
safe for operation and to attempt to determine the useful life still available in the
equipment. This evaluation is done by engineers having manufacturing and
operational experience and a long term understanding of tests and test results that can
be used to assist with this evaluation. The absolute values of test results in most cases
cannot be used, but rather reference is made to the results of previous test results
found on the same equipment as well as results found on similar equipment in various
operating circumstances. If the results show increasing degradation, then other
engineering actions need to be undertaken. Regular scheduled tests need to be
undertaken and the results need to be properly kept and managed. The intervals
between tests on the equipment in service need to be determined by the type of the
equipment, the harshness of the environment, the history of the previous test results,
the age of the equipment, the ease of testing, the impact of failure and the risk of
failure.
4.4 Summary
Commercially available off-line techniques have been reviewed. The advantages and
disadvantages of each technique have been highlighted as have the overall advantages
and disadvantages of off-line testing. The major disadvantage is the duration of the
testing interval which highlights the desirability of an on-line technique. One
particular on-line technique commercially available and utilized in this research has
also been reviewed and then compared to the off-line technique.
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CHAPTERS
THE 275kV TUGELA TEST STATION
5.1 Background
In 1996 Transmission identified the failure of CT' s as a major threat to the business
[4, 22]. These issues had driven the business to undertake the following actions:
• To identify and categorize high risk CT's on the network
• To identify and remove high risk CT's from critical circuits
• To reduce the risk to the system by limiting the number ofCT's in service
• To develop and implement a maintenance procedure for CT's and bushings
• To identify/develop and implement condition monitoring systems for CT's and
bushings
• To reduce the number and consequences of CT and bushing failures on the
network [4, 22].
As a result of the action to identify/ develop and implement condition monitoring
systems for CT's and bushings, a number of strategies were undertaken, namely
• Offline monitoring - 7 offline Doble M4000 test units purchased and in use
• On line monitoring, the HVIEWS system, 10 systems installed.
• On line monitoring, the Insite system, 1 system installed at a power station.
• Oil sampling and analysis, routine oil sampling undertaken on 350 bushings
Although the HVIEWS system was installed at 10 substations, the ability of the
system to track failing insulation in the field situation was not confidently known and
the ability of the system to provide an early warning in time for an operator to isolate
plant safely before failure was also not known.
In order to determine the capability of the HVIEWS system to meet the above criteria,
a project was undertaken to trend the accelerated degradation of the HV insulation on
CT's in a controlled environment.
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The rationale behind the establishment of a controlled environment for the accelerated
degradation of the RV insulation included the following requirements:
• The most credible environment to test the eT's would have been the normal
operating environment in a substation near to the researcher, for easy access. This
was not possible due to the high fault levels near the Durban area, the effect a
failure would have on the voltage supplies to local customers, the effect of the
damage to plant and risk to personnel.
• All research work could have taken place in a laboratory, but this would not
simulate the exact environmental conditions found in the field. Latest information
on the 10 RVIEWS units installed in the substations, indicated that the
environmental conditions were effecting the measurements.
• A test facility could be built in a suitable location to facilitate all aspects of in
service conditions.
5.2 Tugela Substation
After scanning the Transmission and Distribution Networks, a suitable site was
identified at Tugela Substation, to erect a facility suitable for conducting accelerated
aging tests on RV insulation, resulting in failure and destruction of the unit under test.
The test station that has been built by Eskom is situated at the Transmission Tugela
Substation, 35 km form Bergville in the foothills of the Drakensberg Mountains in
KwaZulu Natal. This is the first such test site built by Eskom where primary plant can
safely be tested to destruction. The site has been professionally built, to cater for the
safety of personal and adjacent equipment. This site was built to original
specifications as no other similar test facility could be traced, and is available for the
testing of manufacturer's primary plant equipment and problematic Eskom
equipment. The name Tugela is synonymous with the Tugela River flowing nearby
from its source at Mount Aux Sources in the Drakensberg Mountains (3282 meters
above sea level).
5.2.1 Choice of location and design features
The site is situated in a remote farming area where the farming population is very
sparse and access is via a dust road, which is used mainly by the local farming
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community. The road runs about 200 metres from the equipment and the nearest
neighbour is about 700 metres from the station. Only Eskom authorised personnel
have access to the site. There are no major industrial customers connected to this
electrical network, the local customers are mostly farmers and mountain holiday
resorts, and the electrical distance from major nodes reduces the effect of an electrical
voltage depression to any major customers.
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) was done in the area to assess the
suitability of installing the test station at Tugela. Details of this EIA are included in
Appendix 3.
5.2.2 Test Station Design Features
The test station was designed bearing in mind that on the failure of any plant under
test, pieces of porcelain or shrapnel would be exploded around the immediate area.
Neither personnel nor plant should be put at risk, nor should the failure impact on any
customers in the area. Further there should also be no adverse impact on the

















Figure 5.1: Tugela Substation electrical layout, indicating the 275kV infeeds in red
and the 132kV feeders in green [5].
The supply into Tugela on the 275kV network is via Bloukrans 1 and 3 feeders,
emanating from Bloukrans substation about 62km's away. Also feeding into Tugela
via the 132kV network is a third line, the 132kV Bloukrans 2 line. System studies
have shown that with either one or two of the 275kV lines feeding into Tugela being
out of service, the load full can still be maintained via the 132kV
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Scenario 1,2 X 275kV and 1 X 132kV lines in service
Line kV MW % loading Fault current A
Blkrn 1 275 48.5 10 3839
Blkrn 3 275 48.3 9.9 3787
Blkrn 2 132 4.2 5.5 364
Scenario 2, 1 X 275kV and 1 X 132kV lines in service
Blkrn 1 0 0 0 0
Blkrn 3 275 92.8 18.5 5242
Blkrn 2 132 7.6 9.4 618
Scenario 3, 0 X 275kV and 1 X 132kV lines in service
Blkrn 1 0 0 0 0
Blkrn 3 0 0 0 0
Blkrn 2 132 74.5 90.8 1177
Table 5.1: Fault and load currents for infeeds mto Tugela substatIOn [28].
The system studies indicate that when both Bloukrans - Tugela 275kV lines are out of
service, and only the 132kV line in service, the 132kV line is loaded up to 93% at the
75°C thermal rating. Hence the load can be maintained. Following the loss of the
second 275kV line, a voltage drop from 138kV to 122kV can be expected at the
Tugela 132kV busbar. With the appropriate tapping of the transformers at Bloukrans,
this voltage can be increased to 126kV, which is 95.5% ofthe normal voltage.
The fault current on each Bloukrans - Tugela line when there is a fault at Tugela is
presently 3.8kA, giving an overall fault current of7.6kA. For the condition where one
line is out, the overall fault level decreases and the fault current on the remaining line
increases to 5.2kA [30].
The system studies confirm that the station is secure under normal operating
conditions as well as when one 275kV feeder is out for maintenance and the other
275kV line trips due to a fault, under these circumstances the supplies at the station
are still secure. Load and fault studies are attached as per Appendix 4.
As indicated on the diagram Figure 5.1, the supply to the test station will be taken
from the 275kV Bloukrans 1 feeder. This feeder has a breaker with only one
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mechanism, resulting in a 3 pole trip for single and 3 phase faults. The breaker on the
Bloukrans 3 feeder is capable of single pole tripping for single phase faults and for 3
phase tripping for 3 phase faults, making it more secure for the system when it is the
only 275kV feeder in service.
5.3 The test station
5.3.1 Layout
As the CT test facility only requires a single phase supply, the test station design
entailed tapping off the red phase of the Bloukrans 1 feeder, as the line entered the
RV yard on the station side of the last line tower. At the Tee off at the point the test
station was strung with a single Centipede conductor as shown in Figure 7.3 of
Appendix 7 and was fed into the test station via a 275kV single phase isolator and two
control and protection CT's onto a single busbar which transverses the centre of the
test station. The busbar was suspended from one l2-meter wooden pole, with a set of
silicon 400kV insulators on each end of the station. The isolator and insulators were
recovered from a project at Invubu substation, where they had become redundant. The
single pole isolator was motorised and could be remotely controlled from National
Control at Simmerpan.
5.3.2 Protection scheme
The key to the successful operation of the test station was to ensure effective
protection to minimise the impact of CT faults deliberately caused on the system. The
protection scheme for the test bay included instantaneous earth fault protection
installed on the first control and protection CT (Cl) closest to the single-phase
isolator. During normal steady state conditions no current would flow through the CT,
but under fault conditions the single red phase current would flow via the CT to the
fault and return via the earth. At this point fault current would flow and with the relay
set safely to the minimum setting the relay would operate instantaneously, opening
the local Tugela Bloukrans breaker in 50 milliseconds and isolating the infeed from
the Tugela side. Simultaneously a carrier signal would be sent to the remote
Bloukrans end, where the distance (impedance) protection would have detected a fault
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via the impedance starters in zone 3 and with the receipt of the carrier signal would
trip the remote breaker in 70 milliseconds and thereby isolate the fault.
The protection scheme implemented also included the standard line impedance
protection still in service on this line via this lines own 3 CT's. For a fault in the test
station, this would trip the local end instantaneously in 50 milliseconds and the remote
Bloukrans end would trip in Zone 2 time which was reduced to 100milliseconds.
The standard back up overcurrent and earth fault protection is in service in case the
main impedance protection should fail. In this case the local and remote end would
trip in back up Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) earth fault protection time of
about 200milliseconds.
The control system was programmed to operate as follows, on the receipt of an alarm
from the HIEWS system, indicating an imminent eT failure, the alarm would get
transmitted to National Control in Simmerpan, and they would manually via remote
control, trip the local Tugela Bloukrans 1 feeder. The line would now be off load and
they would open the single red phase test station isolator, thereby removing supply
from the test station. Control would then reclose the local Tugela Bloukrans feeder
and put the feeder back on load.
Should a failure occur in the test station, the local instantaneous earth fault protection
would operate and trip the local breaker. At the same time sending an alarm to
National control indicating that the line had tripped due to a failure in the test bay, and
sending a carrier to the remote end, which would trip. Control would manually via the
remote control system, open the red phase isolator feeding the test station and would
then reclose the line breaker at Bloukrans and then the line breaker at Tugela and so
secure the station supplies.
The auto reclose (ARC) facility was switched off on this line, thereby avoiding any
chance of reclosing onto a fault in the test station.
Should the feeder trip for a normal line fault and not a fault in the test station,
National Control would not get the alarm from the instantaneous earth fault relay on
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the test bay, indicating a fault in the test bay. National Control would understand this
to signify a standard line fault and would reclose the circuit.
Send alarm to
.. Control "Test.... station failure"
-
.. Trip local breaker.... at Tugela (50mS)
Send carrier signal.. to Bloukrans to
enable remote
tripping (70mS)
Figure 5.2: Block diagram indicating tripping logic at Tugela Test station.
Note 1 = failure of unit under test in test station
Note 2 = operation of instantaneous earth fault relay at Tugela
From the above information on the security of the supplies into Tugela and the
enhanced protection system installed, including the standard Transmission remote
control and alarm system via the X25 network and the microwave system to
ENCORE at National Control, it can be seen that the supplies at Tugela are secure
enough to cope with any N-2 contingency. The low fault levels of7.6kA and fast fault
clearance times of maximum 100 milliseconds ensure that any energy supplied to the
fault is minimised. The voltage depressions in the immediate vicinity will not impact
on any customers. Local customers have bought into the test station idea and support
Eskom in this research in order to improve the electrical performance in the long
term.
For the majority of the time the station is unmanned with no one on site. The property
is fenced off with a normal 3-meter high perimeter fence. Inside the outer fence is an
electrified security fence, which has alarms that are monitored 24 hours a day. Access
to the HV yard is then via the prohibited area fence. Access to the test station is via a
live chamber fence, the keys to which are locked in a safe and only available if the
test station is isolated and earthed. Only authorised staff have access to the station.
The design of the protection schemes was a key component of the safe operation of
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the test station (and the network) during the period of the study. There were,
however, a number of other key design issues that had to be addressed due to the
explosive nature of the failure mode of oil-paper insulated eT's. These are discussed
below.








I CT's under Test
Figure 5.3: Tugela Test Station
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I Oil Trap
5.3.3 The safe civil design of the test station [29].
The test station had to be designed to cater for the case of exploding porcelain, oil
spillage, possible fire hazards, and compliance with Eskom Operating Regulations for
HV Equipment, and was not permitted to pose a risk to the operational plant nearby
nor to the personnel who worked on site. To ensure that none of the abovementioned
aspects left out of the design, a design team consisting of the local Inspector of
Machinery, a professional civil engineer, electrical engineers, station operators,
academics and contractors was put together to attend to the design.
5.3.4 Positioning of the test station at Tugela
The HV yard at Tugela was originally constructed with an additional terrace on the
South side of the l32kV yard, to accommodate a future Distribution 33kV yard. This
area had already been levelled and was situated between the incoming 275kv
Bloukrans 1 and 3 lines. Distribution no longer had any plans to make use ofthis area.
A 33kV feed from Tugela was not required for the next 10 years at least.
The proximity ofthis terrace to the incoming lines and the fact that it was the only flat
terraced area requiring little rework led to the choice of this area as the best area for
the test station.
The test station was erected with 8 individual bays, where 8 different pieces of
equipment could be tested at once without anyone interfering with any of the others.
The overhead busbar was erected in such a manner that the test station could be
extended in the future, if this was required without having to move the busbar. So the
busbar was extended to its maximum reach over the area. As the operating voltage
was 275kV, the Occupation Health and Safety Act concerning electrical clearances
had to be adhered to. This meant that all clearances to earth of not less than a
minimum of2.35meter had to be observed.
As can be seen from Figure 5.3 the single red phase dropper tees off the red phase of
the Bloukrans 1, 275kV feeder and is conducted via the motorised isolator (ISl) and
via CT 1 and CT 2, the protection and control CT's, to the single Centipede conductor
busbar. The busbar spans the full length of the present and future test bays. The use
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of Centipede conductor for the single busbar, was based on the cross sectional area of
415.22 square millimetres, consisting of 37 strands with a 50°C thermal rating of
833A. This size of conductor is regularly used at 275kV and introduces minimal
corona effects.
5.3.5 The foundations and walls of the test station [29].
Originally the test station was to be built with a standard 400mrn x 400mm concrete
foundation below the walls, but after excavation of the foundation channels, the soil
was found to be clay. This had never been recorded on the original soil analysis
report, taken at the time of building the substation in 1988. The clay would not hold
the building but would move under the weight to the point that the building broke up
and collapsed. This required a raft foundation to be built out of one solid construction
for the total building. This raft was designed to take the full first phase of the test
station, namely the first 8 cubicles. It was constructed out of reinforced iron and
reinforced concrete. The cost of the raft increased the project cost by R350000.
Each cubicle was to have walls 4,5 meters high above ground to cater for the height of
the CT and the equipment frame base it is mounted on (3.75metres) and still give the
CT clearance so as not to protrude over the top of the wall. As any failure had to be
contained inside the walls and not spray debris over the wall and into the adjacent
equipment. Each cubicle was dimensioned 5.5m by 5.5m to allow for the equipment
to be mounted in the centre and to have clearances of a minimum of 2.35m from any
point of the equipment to any earth point, to satisfy the requirements of the OHS Act.
The clearances for this 275kV test station were designed on the clearance limit for
300kV namely 2.35m to any point. The roof of the test station was designed to be
open, to simulate the normal environment which the equipment under test would be
subjected to in any HV yard. The open roof also allowed for easy access into the
cubicles from the overhead busbar of the 275kV supply. Had the roof been closed,
the test item would not have been subjected to the normal outdoor conditions, and the
275kV supply would have to be introduced via roof/wall bushings. This complication
and unnecessarily high cost would have resulted in this project being considered as
uneconomical. Leaving the roof open had the added value of allowing any shock
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waves from exploding CT's to dissipate without destroying the test station. The civil
diagrams of the test station are in Appendix 7.
Figure 5.4: Balteau SAX245 CT installed in the test station at Tugela.
The photo in Figure 5.4 clearly shows the connection to the 275kV overhead busbar
as well as the shorting conductor across the bar primary, where the rated current
induced from the secondary windings, is circulating. The CT's mounted on the
equipment frame were fitted with clamps on the top connections as well as the
extension stems and the connection to the overhead busbar. The extension stems were
required to ensure the minimum safety clearance to the wall was maintained. Access
between adjacent cubicles is via a common walkway on each side of the centre wall.
The walls of the test station were constructed to British Standard BS5628.1.1992 out
of concrete blocks M200 measuring 190mm, by 190mm, by 380mm, with reinforced
brick force wire between every row. 3.5 MPa blocks and class 3 mortar was used. The
wall's first design calculations required only 1 layer of blocks and the tensile stress
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was found to be excessive. The second design calculation was tried with a double
layer of blocks up to half the height and the design was found to still be unstable as
the stresses were still too high. The final design was with piers from the ground to the
top of the wall staggered at 5.5m centres. With a wind load, the stresses of this design
were within limits. The design of the wall was calculated using Prokon Software. The
top of the wall was capped with capping blocks to prevent rainwater from getting into
the blocks [29].
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Figure 5.5: Construction nearing completion. Visible are the isolator, protection CT
and the poles for the overhead busbar on either side of the building.
Figure 5.6: The lifting ofa CT over the wall ofthe test station during the initial
installation.
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5.4 Safety features of the Tugela test station
5.4.1 Station Access
The access to the test station IS Via the standard access, namely the station IS
surrounded by a 3 meter high, outer perimeter fence, inside that fence is two security
fences, one is energised with high voltage, and is monitored by alarms 24 hours per
day. The entrance is through a 3 metre high gate, control access is only via security
permit. Once inside the station, access to the test station, which is inside a 2m high
fenced area, is via a locked gate, of which the key is kept in a safe and may only be
removed if the station is isolated from the electrical supply and earthed. Under the
Eskom Operating Regulations for High Voltage Systems (ORHVS), access is
prohibited unless the station is isolated electrically and grounded. This is due to there
being the possibility of making inadvertent contact with HV conductors as the CT's
are mounted so low to the ground, only 500mm offthe ground level, in a conventional
situation the CT would be mounted 2m off the ground level. There are three 6m long
gates in the test station perimeter fence to allow for vehicle and crane access.
5.4.2 Fire protection and oil spill protection
The fire protection at the station is a major feature of the design, as a CT failure is
well known to result in fire and oil spills. The internal cubicle floors are all slanted
individually into a channel, where any spilt oil would flow into a specially constructed
oil sump tank. The sump is capable of holding 500 litres of oil and is designed to
ensure that the burning oil would be extinguished safely. The floors of each cubicle
are laid with concrete, so any spilt oil could only flow into the oil sump and no oil
could enter the water system, nor sink into the ground. Once in the oil sump the spilt
oil has to be manually pumped into drums for disposal. The principal operation of the
oil system is to allow the spilt oil to flow into an airtight concrete chamber filled with
water and so preventing air from getting in. As the oil flows into the chamber, it
displaces some of the water, still maintaining the air block. As the oxygen, which was
originally in the chamber, gets burnt up, the fire will extinguish. Any rainwater, which
flows via the oil ducts into the sump, will flow out into a subsoil drain. Around the
test station at 5 meter spacing, portable fire extinguishers are mounted to put out any
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fires. A water/foam 200 litre tank is available at the station in case it maybe needed.
Inside each test cubicle there is only the test object and no other combustible material.
Each cubicle is separated from all the others by 4,5m high walls to ensure that fire
cannot spread beyond the effected cubicle. The area around the test station for a
distance of 7 meters is covered with stone to prevent growth of vegetation and the
build up water. The area set aside for spare equipment and oil drums, is a bunded
concrete surface, where any oil spill is kept in the bunded area and so cannot damage
the environment. A drawing and explanation of the operation of the oil collection and
fire extinguishing system is attached in Appendix 8.
5.4.3 Blast walls
The outer wall of each cubicle has been designed to cope with the percussion blast
experienced when a CT fails. As the RV insulation of the CT degrades to the point of
failure, the dielectric strength decreases to the point that electrical flash over takes
place. The arc under oil rapidly generates large quantities of gas causing a pressure
build up inside the porcelain housing, which ruptures and discharges fragmented
porcelain around it up to reported distances of 70m. The force to launch this flying
porcelain sets up a shock wave that has to exit from the cubicle without knocking over
the walls. In order for the test station to accommodate the shock waves, in each
compartment a 2 x 2-metre hole in the outside wall covered by a 30mm thick rubber
blast mat. Usually this mat is used at blast sites to allow the blast shock wave to
escape but to contain any flying debris.
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Figure 5.8: The blast mat covering a 2 X 2 metre opening in the wall, designed to
allow the shock wave produced by a faulting CT to escape, but to retain any flying
debris.
5.5 Operational experience of the Tugela test station
Once the test site had been put into operation and failures ofCT's were experienced a
number of operational problems were experienced. Some repairs and alterations to
the original design were required. However, in general, the test bay performed to
specification and in particular the test station withstood the failure of a number of
CT's and was available for further testing of plant. Further, the shock wave was
safely dissipated through the rubber blast mats and the exploding fragments of
porcelain were contained inside the cubicle walls. Some slight damage was caused to
some concrete blocks from exploding fragments of porcelain. However, this damage
was easily repaired by removing and replacing these with new blocks. Also
encouraging was the fact that the failed unit in no way affected any of the other units
under test.
Environmentally, whilst the oil spill was correctly channelled into the oil sump, the
fIfe was not correctly extinguished as fire fighters were unable to get near the lid of
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the sump to extinguish the flames due to the heat of the flames. Further, the voltage
depression experienced at the time of the fault, although having no effect on local
customers, affected other substations further removed from the generation source. A
third problem related to communication with National Control which resulted in the
reclosing of the feeder back onto the failed CT. However, the protection system had
operated correctly and had isolated the faulted CT and infeed.
The experiences described above led to some modifications to the test station. These
are listed below:
• A small number of concrete wall blocks in the cubicle of the failed CT, that
experienced some cracks, were removed and replaced with new blocks
• The oil sump was repaired where damage was caused by fire. The operation of the
sump centres on the correct level of water in the sump and local staff were trained
on the operating method of the sump. The heavy metal cover of the sump was cut
into four smaller covers for easy removal.
• A procedure was prepared for National control to ensure that they did not reclose
the infeed onto the faulted CT without first opening the test station isolator.
• The voltage depression had effected the electrical Quality of Supply (QOS) at
neighbouring substations and a series reactor was fitted to reduce the fault level.
A further major modification undertaken involved the fitting of a fault current limiting
reactor at the in-feed to the test station. This is discussed below.
5.5.1 Installation of reactor
The local Transmission Grid had a compact agreement with the local Distribution
Region on the standard of power, which Distribution received from Transmission.
The criteria in the agreement centred on the quality of the power supply, which was
supplied to local customers and the effect this had on the customers' product. One of
the QOS parameters concerned the types and levels of faults and the voltage
depressions caused by the fault. If the voltage depression was greater than a
prescribed level, this voltage depression would be responsible for customer's supplies
switching off in order to protect motors restarting, or the depressions destabilising
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control equipment. These disturbances would shut off supplies and damage product,
which was in the process of being manufactured.
During 1999, the first year of the operation of the test station, the limit for X class
dips (voltage depression of between 20% to 60% for a duration of between 20 and
120 milliseconds) at Bloukrans substation was 7 and the Grids performance had
already reached 5. The first three CT failures at the test station caused the limit at
Bloukrans to be exceeded. Throughout the Transmission substations there are QOS
instruments recording the various dips at different substations. When the 3rd CT failed
on 29/12/1999 while under test, the dips were recorded at various substations and
Table 5.2 indicates the various dips recorded. This dip was on the red phase, showing
a voltage depression of 39.5% for a duration of 110mS and causing the Transmission
Grid to exceed the QOS agreement with Distribution. Voltage dips of the Y class
category were recorded at Ingagane, Georgedale Ariadne and Illovo, a Y class dip
was insignificant and did not impact on customer supplies. Action needed to be taken
to ensure no further failures would create X class dips at Bloukrans.
In order to address the QOS problem, it was necessary to reduce the fault current
which was experienced at Tugela test station during the failure of a test CT. This had
to be undertaken without effecting the correct operation and performance of the
substation and plant and the operation of the protection and isolation of the faulted CT
in the test station.
A 275kV reactor was located at the Apollo AC/DC converter station, the reactor had
never been used before as it had been dropped off the ship on the wharf in Durban
when it was being unloaded. It had minor damage, which could be easily repaired.
The reactor was installed in the test station on the incoming red phase supply
conductor between CT 2 and the overhead busbar. This positioning would insure that
under steady state conditions the reactor was not carrying any current but only came
into operation when a CT failed and the fault current passed through the reactor. Civil
modifications had to be made to accommodate the reactor on a plinth near the
incoming feed and the busbar. The fault studies undertaken with the reactor indicated
that the reactor would limit the fault current sufficiently to prevent an X class dip at
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Bloukrans. The voltage dip was reduced to a Y class dip, which was not counted, as it
had no impact on customer plant.
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Table 5.2: The X class dips, which affected the Transmissions Grid performance for
1999 can be seen on the recording of voltage dips.
The protection continued to operate correctly for all the failures that took place at the
test station and a recording of the fault as seen by the Tugela protection at Bloukrans
is indicated on Appendix 5, fIrstly the breaker at the Tugela end opens and the current
increases as the full load current is fed from the Bloukrans end of the feeder. At point
2 the Bloukrans end of the feeder opens and isolates the fault. The recording is for the
failure of the 2nd eT, on 14/12/99, prior to the installation of the reactor. The
recording indicates the fault was on the red phase to neutral, with a peak current of
9kA and a duration of 120mS.
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The fault studies show that there is a substantial decrease in the fault currents flowing
at Tugela when the 57mH series reactor is installed. Table 5.3. and 5.4 shows the
comparative fault currents with and without the reactor.
Feeder Fault current Fault current with Change (%)
without the reactor the reactor (A)
(A)
Tugela - Bloukrans 1 2900 1589 45.2
Tugela - Bloukrans 2 2861 1568 45.2
275/132kV transformer 1 1148 647 43.6
275/132kV transformer 2 1143 643 43.7
Total fault current (phasor 7970 4311 45.9
sum)
Table 5.3: Fault current contnbutions at Tugela 275kV busbar [30].
Substation Faulted phase Faulted phase % improvement
voltage without voltage with reactor
reactor / % dip /% dip
Tugela 275kV OkV 78.2kV 46
100% 54%
Bloukrans 275kV 92.9kV 128.5kV 46
45% 24%
Danskraal275kV 101.7kV 133.0kV 48
40% 21%
Venus 400kV 186.6kV 214.6kV 46
24% 13%
Chivelston 400kV 209.4kV 225.6kV 50
14% 7%
Table 5.4. Phase voltages dunng a smgle-phase fault [30]
Table 5.4 shows that there is a 46% improvement at Bloukrans in the magnitude of
the voltage dip on the faulted phase when the reactor is installed. The previous faults
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without the reactor in service indicated voltage depressions of 39.5%, an
improvement of 46% with the reactor in service would see a dip of only 21%. With
the dynamic state of the system, where all plant is not in service all the time, this
indicates that the faults would fall out of the X class and into the less significant Y
class. The 4th and 5th CT failures caused voltage depressions of less than 20% in the Y
class [32]. Figure 5.10 shows the completed test station with the current limiting
reactor installed in the 275kV circuit between the control CT (also shown) and the
overhead busbar.
Figure 5.10: Tugela test station with the 275kV, 57mH reactor installed.
Figure 5.11 below shows an aerial photograph of the test station. The reactor is
installed on the left-hand side, with a clear view of the 8 cubicles where the CT's are
installed and the blast mats installed in the walls. The single phase 275kV overhead
busbar can be seen transversing the top ofthe cubicles. In the foreground is the 275kV
yard ofthe substation.
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Figure 5.11: Completed 275kV-test station with reactor in position.
Figure 5.12 below shows a a single line diagram of the test station, indicating the
single red phase 275kV connection between the test station and the overhead
Tugela/Bloukrans feeder, the current limiting reactor, the 8 cubicles, the overhead
















Figure 5.12: Tugela test station with the senes reactor positioned between the
protection eT's and the overhead busbar.
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5.6 Summary
The original planned cost of the Tugela test station was R1.1 million. The final cost of
establishing the test station was R380 000. These cost-savings were achieved without
compromising the design requirements. The station may accommodate up to 8 test
objects. The objects may be energized at a system voltage equivalent of 275 kV and
subjected to aging mechanisms without creating problems for the National Grid.
The Tugela Test Station is a station built to tight standards to assist the High Voltage
industry in solving any HV electrical problems, which may arise.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN AT TUGELA TEST STATION.
6.1 Introduction
Investigations and research was carried out in three locations, depending of the
suitability of the location for the specific task. The locations were the High Voltage
Laboratory at University of Natal, the Tugela test station and in various Transmission
substations where the HVIEWS system was installed.
The aim of the research was to determine:
• Whether the HVIEWS system tracks the insulation condition?
• Whether the HVIEWS system alarms the operator to an unhealthy condition
of HV insulation, in time for the operator to take the necessary action to
secure the plant before failure?
The procedures to be followed were:
• To trend the failure of hermetically sealed insulation under accelerated
degradation conditions
• To monitor the associated effect on the dissipation factor (tan delta) measurement
and quantify the accuracy of the data in relation to the degraded insulation
condition. This will define the extent to which HVIEWS tracks the failure
• To determine the amount of warning time given by the HVIEWS monitoring
system to enable safe removal of the faulty unit from service prior to failure.
A number of Balteau SAX 245 CT's were removed from Impala substation. These
CT's were chosen for the following reasons:
• These CT's had been in service for longer than 25 years (the economic life span)
and the condition of the HV insulation was unknown
• It was suspected that the rubber bellows, at the top of the CT, for oil expansion,
was perishing and allowing moisture into the HV insulation.
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• A number of similar CT's had failed, 3 at Impala, 1 at Illovo and 1 at Mersey and
this had large financial and power outage complications for Eskom and local
customers.
• The violent nature of the failures had focused attention on the safety of personnel
and plant.
One of these CT's was removed and installed in the laboratory at the University of
Natal, and 10 other CT's were removed to Tugela test station. Eight were installed for
operation.
6.2 Research carried out at Tugela test station.
The initial aIm of the research performed at Tugela test station was firstly to
determine the state of the insulation of the CT's as delivered from Impala substation.
Secondly to then energize the CT's and monitor them for an initial settling in period
and thirdly to then cause degradation of the CT's and monitor them until failure for a
number of fault mechanisms.
The following investigations were carried out at Tugela test station
• Measurement of electrical parameters of CT's
• Energisation of8 CT's at 275kV
• On line tan delta measurements
• Off line tan delta measurements
• Oil sampling and analysis
• Accelerated degradation of RV insulation by back energisation of CT secondary
circuits - 3 failure incidents
• Accelerated degradation of RV insulation by reducing RV insulation - 1 failure
incident
• Tear down and analysis of a failed CT
6.2.1 Measurement of electrical parameters of eT's at Tugela test station
Eight CT's had been installed at Tugela test station, each one in its own cubicle. Once
installed and connected to the RVIEWS system it was necessary to measure all the
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electrical parameters of the CT's to determine if the CT's could still be operated
safely and to be able to trend the results of on going tests with base case conditions.
All relevant data was recorded.
6.2.2 Measurement of electrical parameters of CT's at Tugela test station
All CT's installed are Balteau SAX 245, rated at 21kA for 3s, 275kV, 25 years old,
each with 5 secondary cores, with ratios of 2400/1, ex Impala substation. All CT's
indicate acceptable results.
Tan delta and capacitance tests were done on all remaining CT's after every CT
failure and the results were compatible with the results in Table 6.1.
Test Serial Tan Name plate Measured Meggar
bay Number delta Capacitance Capacitance Reading
No Value (pF) (pF) values
1 76/53288/0 0.0043 657.07 589.4 Infinity
1
2 76/53288/1 0.0056 657.53 584.2 Infinity
7
3 76/53288/0 0.0055 627.28 588.8 Infinity
7
4 76/53288/1 0.0051 644.35 589.4 Infinity
1
5 76/53288/0 0.0044 650.3 585.5 Infinity
2
6 76/53288/0 0.0056 655.56 587.1 Infinity
8
7 76/53288/2 0.0052 635.14 588.6 Infinity
1
8 76/53288/1 0.0051 650.3 586.6 Infinity
5
Table 6.1: Electncal parameter measurements from CT's Installed at the Tugela test
station.
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6.2.3 Back-Energisation of 8 eT's at 275kV
The CT's were all connected overhead to the 275kV single-phase (red phase)
conductor of the Bloukrans/Tugela 1 275kV feeder. The CT's were not exposed to
load current but were back energised in an attempt to simulate the heating created by
load conditions. The back-energization was achieved by firstly a jumper connecting
the primary terminals PI and P2 together was installed. This allows primary current to
circulate in the presence of any secondary current. A separate 220Vac supply (single
phase from a three-phase supply installed outside the test bays) was connected via
programmable contacts to selected secondary windings to force a current through the
secondary windings.
The result was a primary current that could be applied and removed as required. As
shown in figure 6.1 below, three of the five secondary cores of the CT under test were
back energised at 220 volts (single phase from a three-phase 380 volts supply). The
two remaining secondary cores were short-circuited. The selected secondary cores
have a ratio of 2400/1. With the measured secondary winding load current of 0,5
amps, 1200 amps was induced in the primary bar. A timer that switched the circuit on
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Figure 6.1: Back energising circuit.
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6.2.4 Energisation of 8 CT's at 275kV
On 25/11/1999 at 12hOO the Tugela test station was energised at rated voltage (lpu).
The back energising was not energised immediately as the HVIEWS system required
time to register the initial data on the system. The back energising circuit was set to
come into operation at 8HOO on the following day, 26/11/99 and to stay in service
until 16hOO when it would be automatically disconnected.
6.2.5 On line tan delta measurements
The CT's were all connected to the HVIEWS system and the following parameters
were recorded.
Unit Id Channel Phase Feeder Relative tan HVIEWS
delta input
voltage
1 28 R Test CT1 1.5 42
2 27 R Test CT2 2.1 44
3 26 R Test CT3 1.5 43
4 25 R Test CT4 1.2 41
5 21 R Test CT8 -3.6 44
6 22 R Test CT7 -2.4 43
7 23 R Test CT6 -1.8 41
8 24 R Test CT5 -3.6 45
9 20 R RefCT1 -2.7 43
10 19 R RefCT2 1.64 44
11 16 R BloukR 1.9 44
12 17 W Blouk W Nil 43
13 18 B Blouk B Nil 42
Table 6.2: table mdIcates relatlve tan b values recorded from by HVIEWS at Tugela.
Table 6.2 Indicates that all the relative tan b values of the CT's in the test were being
recor4ed by HVIEWS, all instantaneous parameters were in specification. The relative
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tan delta required a number of hours of operation before enough data was
accumulated to make a relative tan delta calculation.
6.2.6 Off line tan delta measurements
The off-line tan delta measurements were all taken as part of the electrical parameters
required to be used as a base case for trending of any insulation degradation. These
measurements taken with the CSD Loss tangent Instrument as shown in Table 6.1 are
compared to the on-line measurements shown in Table 6.2. No repeatable comparison
could be made between the on-line relative tan delta measurements and the off-line
CSD tan delta measurements. As can be seen, no repeatable comparison can be made.
CT4 and CT8 both have the same off-line measurement of 0.0051, but the on-line
measurements are 1.2 and -3.6 respectively. The reason for this is because the on-line
measurement for CT4 is the value of the difference of tan 0 measurements ofCT4 and
CT5 (relative tan 0), whereas the off-line measurement is the absolute tan 0 value at
the time.
6.2.7 Oil sampling and analysis
Oil samples were taken from CT's In each test bay and sent for Dissolved Gas
Analysis (DGA), The samples were taken prior to the energising of the CT's by
removing 100ml of oil from the reservoir on the top of the CT. The oil sample is
removed with a special device, which opens a ball valve just below the top of the
reservoir and then the collection of the oil via a tube into a bottle. The bottles were
sent to the Eskom TSI laboratory in Rosherville, where the headspace method of
analysis was completed. The headspace method ensures that the gas just above the
liquid in the bottle, once stirred up is analysed. This analysis is undertaken to ensure
that the CT's RV insulation is not degrading from heat or electrical stress. The results
were to be used to trend the condition of the insulation.
6.2.8 Oil sampling and analysis
Oil sampling was undertaken on all CT's remaining in the test station after every
failure of a CT and the analysis was compatible with the results below, indicating that
CT's which had not failed were still healthy. After the second failure CT 2 indicated
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elevated Hydrogen levels, a 10kV tan delta test was done and the CT was found to be
in specification. This CT never failed.
Bay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Limit
H2 1 4 1 3 1 1 3 4 140
Methane 2 3 3 3 5 3 2 2 40
CO 15 7 7 5 12 7 5 8 1000
CO2 661 819 619 616 535 584 545 520 3400
Ethylene 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 30
Ethane 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 70
Acetylene 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Table 6.3: DGA results for each CT mdIcatmg no SIgnS of overheatmg or electncal
stress. All values are well within limits [31].
6.3 Accelerated degradation of HV insulation by back energisation
of eT secondary circuits - 3 failure incidents.
The Tugela test station, including the 8 test CT's were energised at 275kV for the first
time on 25th November 1999. The whole purpose of this experiment was to rapidly
fail CT's and determine if the HVIEWS system tracked the evolution of the failure
mechanism. This was necessary to determine if the HVIEWS system could timeously
indicate an imminent HV insulation failure (i.e. in time for the unit to be removed
from service prior to failure).





November 1999 at 08hOO the secondary windings were energised to allow
the load current to flow in the bar primary of the CT. Approximately 5h30minutes
later (i.e. at 13h35), the CT in bay number 5 failed catastrophically. The epoxy head
of the CT shattered, as did the porcelain, sending debris flying into the walls. This
caused a fire, which set the oil alight and burnt the CT to the ground.
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The protection operated correctly isolating the Tugela Bloukrans 1 feeder. The local
control centre operators who were new to the test bay operations assumed that there
was a line fault and re-energised the line, once from each end of the line, resulting in
an additional two voltage dips. Although alarms had been received at the local control
centre the change from the normal operating procedure had caused confusion with the
operators.
Figure 6.2: The remains ofthe failed CT in test bay 5 (26 November 1999 at 13h35).
The burning oil was difficult to extinguish, as was the rubber blast mat, which had
caught fire. These items re-ignited every time they were extinguished. The fire burnt
in the oil sump until the oil had burned out.
The burning oil damaged the oil sump and set the blast mat alight. The fire fighting
capability was not adequate to extinguish the oil fire. The failure of the CT was
initially assumed to be due to equipment damage during transport and installation.
After inspecting the debris, a number of small arc marks were found all along the bar
primary of the CT. Due to the fact that the CT had been exposed to repeated fault
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currents across the damaged insulation, the mechanical damage had been too
extensive to draw conclusions from the debris.
The test station had successfully withstood its first plant failure. There were some
minor holes in the walls requiring minor repairs. The station was repaired and a new
CT installed in bay 5. New and improved fire fighting equipment was installed.
Additional alarms and procedures were sent to the local control staff.
6.3.1.1 HVIEWS results for the first eT failure
The above failure on the 26th of November 1999 had occurred too soon after
energising, for the HVIEWS system to produce a fingerprint. In the event that this
failure simulated real apparatus insulation failure, the system did not detect the
failure. On further analysis of the captured HVIEWS data, the calculated relative
dissipation factor reflected a change associated with the failing CT. The HVIEWS
recorded a rapid change in relative dissipation factor over a period of only 1 hour and
24 minutes prior to the final catastrophic stage of deterioration. The relative tan delta
changed from 0.5 to - 6.85, a change of 7.35 over the last hour and 24 minutes prior
to failure.
























Figure 6.3: HVIEWS relative tan delta ofthe CT in test bay 5 relative to the CT in test
bay 2.
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Figure 6.3 above shows the HVIEWS recording of test CT5 (the CT in test bay 5)
relative dissipation factor (tan delta) relative to CT2 (the CT in test bay 2). The
influence of the circulating primary and secondary currents can be seen from 08h33
where the calculated relative dissipation factor (tan delta) showed a marginal increase
due to the back energising circuit.
From 12h04 this same variable shows a rapid change in amplitude in the opposite
direction to the back energising fluctuation. The CT failed at 13h35. Typically prior to
a failure of the magnitude experienced here, the failing insulation would be
accompanied by an increase in the resistive current (leakage current) flowing through
that insulation. The increase in the relative tan delta may be ascribed to one or more
actual mechanism. The back energisation may cause overheating of the secondary
coils and hence a temperature rise of the insulation in the vicinity of these coils. This
temperature rise, as discussed in Chapter 2, may then lead to an increase in tan delta.
Another mechanism may be related to the production of bubbles by the overheated
windings and hence partial discharges (Pd) may occur. This bubble related pd may
lead to a carbonised path (puncture of the paper) and hence a reduction in the stressed
region i.e. an increase in electrical stress across the unbridged portion of the
insulation, being reflected as an increase in tan delta. A third possibility is the bubbles
are responsible for introducing very large pd in the CT and that such large pd events
may be reflected as an increase in tan delta. Such a relationship is discussed by Kuffel
[35].
6.3.2 Failure two
Still using the back energising experimental procedure, at 17h40 on 13 December
1999 the test bay was re-energised. At this stage there were 8 Balteau CT's under test,
seven of the original ones and a replacement in bay 5. The secondary windings were
not energised at this time.
At 08hOO on the 14th December 1999, the back energising circuits were switched on
and at 15h21 (i.e. approximately 7h20minutes later) the CT in test bay 5 failed. The
local control centre correctly handled this failure and all alarms had functioned
correctly. Only one voltage dip was recorded and a minor fire was successfully
extinguished. The damage to the CT was minor with only the epoxy head splitting and
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the porcelain remaining intact. The cause of the failure was initially assessed as
moisture collecting in the head of the CT and forming a conductive path between the
earth shield around the secondary cores and the line potential conductive tape in the
epoxy head. Heating due to the high levels of dissipated power within the secondary
cores was not discounted as the primary cause of failure.
Figure 6.4: Second CT failure in test bay 5 (14 December 1999 at 15h21) minor
cracks in the epoxy head are visible.
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Figure 6.5: Top view - Paper insulation cut back to expose the arc point.
Figure 6.5 indicates the top of the eT with the paper insulation cut back to expose the
point where the electric arc from the RV conductive tape flashed to the top of the
earth shield of the secondary cores. This supports the hypotheses that maybe the
increased voltage stress across the paper insulation, caused by the overheating and the
bubbles led to pd and resulted in the flashover.
6.3.2.1 HVIEWS results for the second eT failure
During the second failure on 14 December 1999, the test station had once again been
energised for too short a period to develop fmgerprints of the relative dissipation
factor (tan delta). Therefore the established algorithms do not identify the failures
being simulated in this fashion. Further analysis of the recorded data again indicated a
rapid change in leakage current prior to the final catastrophic failure.
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Time from 13 December 1999
Figure 6.6: HVIEWS relative tan delta of the CT in test bay 5 relative to the CT in test
bay 2.
According to the data shown above in Figure 6.6, the relative dissipation factor (tan
delta) increased from 08h06 when the back energising circuit switched on. At 14h08
the relative dissipation factor again (as in failure one above) rapidly changed direction
(polarity) and increased towards failure at 15h21. The relative tan delta changed from
1 to 6.8 a change of7.8% in a period of 1 hour and 13 minutes. Due to pressure from
the region to limit the number of voltage depressions, the supplier added algorithms to
their HVIEWS system to alarm in the event of any leakage current measurement
changing by more than 1% from the previous measurement (i.e. over a period of two
data samples, or 12 minutes).
6.3.2.2 Tear down and analysis of a failed eT
The CT was stripped of the helmet, the oil drained, the metal base removed, the
porcelain shell was removed, leaving the epoxy cast head containing the secondary
cores and the paper insulation around the earthed shell and connecting cables. The
epoxy head had to be cut off with an angle grinder, taking care not to get injured by
exploding epoxy as the cast pressure was released. This was a very difficult process
and then fine epoxy dust, from the grinding covered the whole area. Once the epoxy
was removed, the paper insulation and secondary cores were removed to allow
analysis to determine the cause of failure.
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The CT was stripped and the cause of failure was found to be the overheating of the
secondary CT cores, caused by the back energisation of these circuits. The resultant
power dissipated in the secondary windings as a result of the applied voltage has
produced abnonnally high temperatures in the windings given the power dissipated as
a result ofthe applied voltage of 219 volts and load current of 0.5 amps. The windings
were rated at 10 watts and the actual power injected into these windings was as high
as 100 watts. These conditions could not be considered "nonnal" and the insulation
was not designed to dissipate this type of heat. This heat was also proved during the
laboratory experiments under back energisation, see Table 7.1.4 which indicates an
average temperature increase above ambient by 13°C, and a tan delta increase from
0.0039 to 0.0045 in 4 hours of back energisation.
The dissection ofthe CT showed that burning had taken place in the insulation around
the CT secondary cores. The burning under oil caused gas production, which bubbled
up through the metallic shell housing the secondary cores. The bubbles lodged in the
paper insulation in the top of the CT, where signs of partial discharge were found in
the paper insulation as indicated in Figure 6.8. The insulation and dielectric strength
was severely degraded and failed through the top of the CT as show in Figure 6.4 and
6.5.
As the paper insulation was removed some small areas of X wax was found. This
insulation degradation was assumed to have come from the 25 years of operational
duty and was not near the site where the flash over had occurred.
The tear down continned the hypotheses of overheating of the CT secondary
windings resulting in large amounts of pd and hence tracking as the primary cause of
failure.
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Figure 6.7: The damaged eT with epoxy stripped back, exposing damage to RV
screen which flashed over to earthed shell around secondary cores.
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Figure 6.8: Stripped back insulating paper showing signs of partial discharge and
treeing between paper layers.
Figure 6.9: The dissected eT showing the RV stress screen attached to the bar
primary conductor and in service at RV potential.
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Figure 6.10: The stripped secondary cores of the damaged eT showing the burning
marks caused by the overheating from the back energisation.
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Figure 6.11: The CT secondary cores inserted inside the metallic, earthed shield.
6.3.3 Failure three
Using the back energising experimental procedure, the station was re-energised at
13h46 on the 23rd of December 1999. Only the original 7 CT's were left in service
and the failed CT in bay 5 had been isolated. At this time the back energising circuits
were left out of service, as this was considered a possible cause of the sudden failure
of the first two CT's. HVIEWS requires a fingerprint of the relative dissipation factor
(tan delta). To enable this fingerprint to be generated a minimum period of 5 days of
measurements are required with no external ageing influences in service during these
fIrst 5 days. At 08h50 on the 29th of December 1999 after a fingerprint had been
established, the back energising circuit was put back in service. At 15h28 on the 29th
of December 1999 the CT in test bay 8 failed (i.e. approximately 7h30 minutes after
back energising).
This third failure was catastrophic, with flying epoxy and porcelain. The
consequential fIre was diffIcult to extinguish. The analysis of the failure was once
again diffIcult due to the extensive damage and fire eliminating most of the evidence.
The only remaining evidence was an arc mark once again on the earth shield
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surrounding the secondary cores. In this case a link between the back energising,
secondary winding burnout and the failure was more likely.
After this third failure, the Transmission regional management recommended that the
test station oil sump and the fault levels inflicted by the test station be attended to
before any further tests continue. The test station was shut down until (1) a current
limiting reactor could be installed, (2) the oil sump design was improved and (3) the
sub soil drains improved. This was duly completed.
6.3.3.1 HVIEWS results for the third eT failure
During the third failure of a test CT at 15h28 on the 29th of December 1999, the CT's
had been energised for a period long enough to establish fingerprint references. The
failure related HVIEWS data did not reflect a gradual change in relative dissipation
factor (tan delta). The system algorithms reflect moving averages over 540 samples.
Therefore any rapid changes do not translate to a change in condition until sufficient
samples change the overall weighting. Hence the original design parameters of the
system did not detect the impending failure. The new algorithms with the rapid
change alarm did detect the impending failure and could send an alarm to the National
Control Centre. The HVIEWS systems' attempt to transmit the fax was recorded in
the HVIEWS log files. Unfortunately the facsimile system set up to send the alarm
failed and the alarm never reached the Control Centre. The alarm was initiated in time
for the operators to have taken action to timeously switch the plant out.
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Figure 6.12 below shows that the rapid alarm is initiated on a minimum 1% step
change in relative tan delta that occurred at 15h02, 24 minutes prior to the failure. The
tan delta variable started increasing from 14h37 and at 15h28 the unit failed, the rapid
changes took 51 minutes and the relative tan delta changed by 4.6%.
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Figure 6.12: HVIEWS ''% relative tan delta" ofCT in test bay 8.
The 24 minutes between alarm and failure would be sufficient for an operator to
respond appropriately to isolate the faulty CT prior to failure.
6.4 Accelerated degradation of DV insulation by reducing DV
insulation - 1 failure incident
The back energisation experiment was abandoned due to the very rapid failure modes
resulting from this procedure. In an attempt to achieve a slower fault mechanism a
second method to degrade the insulation was undertaken, this method is explained
below.
6.4.1 Establishing voids in the insulation layers
The insulation within a CT is graded by connecting the outermost layer to the primary
voltage and the innermost layer to ground. Therefore all layers in between will carry a
portion of the electric field stresses. The design ensures that each layer can
accommodate the electrical stresses exerted on that layer. The experiment carried out
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included using 10 metallic nails to puncture the insulation to a depth of half the
overall primary insulation. The nails were then withdrawn. The basic procedure is
shown in Figure 6.13 and 6.14.
The result was expected to be a series of voids. Since the paper insulation is oil
impregnated, the holes left by the nails will not remain open. Oil would seep into the
spaces and the pressure from the existing paper insulation would force the damaged
paper edges back into the holes. The extent to which the paper would refill the holes
could not be controlled and as such it was expected that a series of non-uniform voids
would remain capturing air in some places where the paper and oil closed before the
air could escape.
These new voids were expected to change the capacitance of the insulation and
consequently the angle between system voltage and insulation leakage current was
expected to change. The difference between the previously healthy insulation and the
newly damaged insulation should be reflected as a step change in the "insulation
condition". Whilst no insulation in a high voltage apparatus will experience a
transition from perfectly healthy to this severe condition without some intermediate
indication of deterioration, the impact of the experiment will be sufficient to define a
controlled change in insulation state.
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Figure 6.13: The top reservoir of the eT showing the insulation below the oil. The
nail was used to damage the insulation.
Figure 6.14: The nail was used to make 10 holes in the RV insulation to a depth of
half of the paper insulation The holes were made in an evenly spaced circle 80mrn
from the centre.
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Figure 6.15 below illustrates the manner in which the insulation was damaged.
Without the presence ofpressure from the insulation walls surrounding the cavity and























Figure 6.15c: Nails removed
Figure 6.16 below represents an untested hypothesis of how the paper insulation may
close around the cavities from layers Cs and C6 illustrated in Figure 6.15 above.
I LayerC.. • 6..
Figure 6.16a: Non-uniform cavity
closure creating voids.
Figure 6.16b: Oil seepage into voids.
The current before the nail damage should primarily be as a result of the capacitive
layers. After the damage, the leakage current may increase in relation to the damage
done and the partial discharge taking place. This new current may contain a resistive
component resulting in the angle between the system voltage and leakage current
adjusting in accordance with the ratio between capacitive and resistive currents. The
available area exposed for the experiment is relatively small. Given that 10 nails were
driven into the insulation to a depth equal to half the total insulation thickness, the
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presence of voids would be evident across the entire insulation surface to a depth of
50% of the insulation. A significant step change in "insulation condition" should be
reported by HVIEWS [32]. Such gross damage to the insulation may also be
expected to generate very large pd and hence tracking in the insulation.
6.4.2 Failure four
Using the experimental procedure creating voids in the insulating layers as described
above, the CT in test bay 5 was damaged. The station was re-energised at 14h28 on
the 20th of December 2000. The CT failed at 03h39 on the 21 st of December 2000 (i.e.
approximately 13hours after energisation). The protection system at the Tugela
substation triggered instantaneously on the test bay protection, and tripped the Tugela
breaker. A carrier signal was sent to the remote end to accelerate tripping of the
remote end breakers at Bloukrans substation. The carrier signal was not received at
Bloukrans substation. The remote end protection did however operate as a result of
"zone 3" triggering. The fault was isolated 1.07 seconds after the failure.
The test bay was remotely isolated by Mkondeni control and the Bloukrans Tugela 1
275kV line was re-energised on load within 3 minutes.
6.4.2.1 HVIEWS results for the fourth eT failure
Figure 6.17 below shows the relative dissipation factor (tan delta) reported by
HVIEWS following the nail damage to the insulation.
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Figure 6.17: CT Failure in the Tugela test station on 21 December 2000.
After energizing the CT, the relative dissipation factor (tan delta) increased rapidly
from -2% to +6%. From the time the CT was energised, the HVIEWS reported
relative dissipation factor (tan delta) gradually increased to 15% before falling away
to 9% at destruction. Several step changes were observed both upwards and
downwards.
The increase in relative dissipation factor as seen over the 6 hour period from
approximately 8:20pm to 2:30am may be interpreted as a "gradual" increase given the
severe damage done to the insulation. The damaged insulation has further deteriorated
under the stresses of the operating voltage. The remaining insulation carries more
electrical stress than it was designed for and deteriorates at an accelerated rate. It may
be possible to extrapolate this severe damage to less severe deterioration.
Under normal conditions, less severe and more typical insulation deterioration will
also transfer more stresses to the remaining insulation. The increase in stresses across
the remaining insulation may be negligible until a limit is reached. Above this limit,
the stresses will breakdown the insulation in a similar fashion as reported by
HVIEWS here. The relative dissipation factor figures produced by HVIEWS here
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have not been translated to actual dissipation factor values as the CT was destroyed
during this test.
6.5 Summary
The back energisation of the CT's to rapidly induce failure was found to be reliable
and very quick. 3 CT's failed within a few hours of energisation. The HVIEWS
system tracked the varying tan delta recordings, which were all similar.
The second failure mode of damaging the HV insulation was also successful as on
energisation the CT condition changed immediately as was expected. The HVIEWS
system also tracked this failure.
The test station operated as designed and successfully contained the violent and
explosive failure of the damaged CT's.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
LABORATORY AND AT VARIOUS TRANSMISSION STATIONS
WHERE HVIEWS IS INSTALLED.
7.1 Research carried out at the laboratory at University of Natal.
Certain investigations were carried out in the laboratory of the University of Natal.
The objective was to ana1yze in a more controlled environment some of the issues and
problems experienced at the Tuge1a Test Station. In particular, the impact of the back
energisation of the CT was investigated, as was the impact of the climatic parameters
(moisture ingress onto the standoff insulator) on the accuracy of the recorded tan delta
values. The total set of measurements performed in the laboratory thus comprised:
• Measurements of electrical parameters of a CT
• Back energisation of a CT
• Temperature rise tests under back energisation
• Measurement of changing tan delta and capacitance values as quality insulation
medium (oil) is changed
• Varying the tan delta values by introducing resistance paths into the measuring
circuit (spraying water onto the insulators)
The CT listed below in Table 7.1 was transported from Impa1a substation and
installed in the HV laboratory at University of Natal
7.1.1 Measurement of electrical parameters of eT
The following electrical parameters were recorded and measured on the CT
• All the name plate data was recorded
• Secondary core resistances
• Secondary core ratios
• Meggar test of secondary and primary cores
• Resistance of bar primary
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• Resistance of bar primary loop with shorting conductor installed
• Magnetisation curve of all secondary cores
• CT tan delta
• CT capacitance
The purpose of these measurements was to determine the state of the CT prior to
testing, to ensure it was in a healthy condition for the experiment. The results obtained
are listed in Table 7.1 below.
Balteau SAX 245 Serial Number 54679/18. Ratio 275kV, Amp 160011, TanD
0.00391, Capacitance 588.5pF. Temp 19.7°C, oil 318L, weight 1l00kg, Fault
rating 21kA for 3s. Date 21/1/2000.
Secondary Resistance Megger Megger Mag Mag Ratio.
core Ohm to Earth to Prim Curve Curve
500V 500V Volts mA
1 13,5 Infinity Infinity 200/400/ 3.5/4.9/ 1600/1
600/800 6.0/7.2
2 13,4 Infinity Infinity 200/400/ 2.9/4.7/ 1600/1
600/800 5.8/6.99
3 2.9 Infinity Infinity 200/400/ 10.6/19.1/ 1200/1
600/800 36.9/96.3
4 2.8 Infinity Infinity 200/400/ 10.1/17.3/ 1200/1
600/800 35.8/103
Table 7.1: Measurement results of CT m the laboratory mdIcatmg the CT to be m a
healthy state.
Notes:
l.Resistance measured with Fluke 77, No PP10132
2.Insu1ation measured with Bridge Meggar University 17981 Inst. 290 at 500V.
3. Tan delta and capacitance was measured with Hathaway CSD. PTM 5892 Loss
Angle Bridge
Resistance measurements (i.e. resistance measurements determined by using a high
current and measuring the volt drop to determine the resistance) were performed on
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the complete primary loop, consisting of bar primary, 1,64m of Centipede conductor,
and 2 clamps. The instrument used was an AB Chance Digital Micro Ohmmeter, AO
00172413 (Pinetown Depot) at a temperature of 19°C.





Table 7.2: Resistance test results of primary CT ClrcUlt.
The values obtained for the CT in the laboratory were similar to those obtained at
Tugela Test Station for similar CT's.
7.1.2 Temperature measurements under back energisation of the eT.
The following method was used to inject current on the secondary cores of the CT.
The CT's in the laboratory are not exposed to a load current, as is the case with CT's
in full operation. The same procedure as was used at Tugela was used to back
energise the CT's in the laboratory.
Figure 6.1 shows that two of the four secondary cores of the CT under test were back
energised at 380 volts. The two remaining secondary cores were short-circuited. The
selected secondary cores in this case have a ratio of 1600/1. With the measured
secondary windings load current of 0,5 amps, 800 amps was induced in the primary
bar.
The results of different configurations of injection of 220V AC onto vanous
secondary CT cores with the Primary of the CT short between PI and P2 are recorded
below.
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Configuration Current on Voltage on Current on Calculated
of secondary secondary Is secondary Vs primary Ip ratio
cores
Core 3 and 4 9.6mA 358 6A 623/1
short circuit, Note 1
inject on core
1, core 2 open
Core 2, 3 and 4 250mA 385 395A 1580/1 Note 2
shorted, inject
on core 1
Core 3 and 4 1.02A 385 796A 1592/1 Note 3
shorted, inject
on core 1 and 2
Table 7.3: Results of back energising secondary cores III vanous configuratIOns.
Note 1: Core 2 is open and creating a high impedance path, which reflected to the
primary of the CT is still seen as a high impedance and so restricts the primary
current.
Note 2: Injection is only on one secondary core and the ratio is 1580/1 which is
indicating that the back energisation is operating correctly as the actual ratio is 1600/1
and shows a correlation
Note 3: Injection is on 2 cores in parallel, and the ratio is correct, as each core would
take half the injected current of lAmp. making the ratio 1600/1 as per nameplate.
While the CT was being back energized, the temperature rise was recorded over a
number of days, see Table 7.4 below.
The purpose of this was to determine the effect of the heat caused by the back
energisation of the secondary cores. It is a well know fact that the tan delta
measurement changes with increased temperature, and the degradation of insulation is
rapidly increased with the increase in temperatures. Temperatures were measured and
recorded on certain critical spots on the CT body, while the heat created by the back
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energisation was in service. Recordings were taken until the temperature rise reached
a stable condition. The purpose of this research was to determine if the back
energisation was the cause of the failure or if the failures could be attributed to any
other cause, which was experienced in the operational conditions.
The temperature was measured at various places on the CT where heating was
indicated. The temperature measurement was made with the CT Thermal Camera, No
47952, supplied by Distribution East Region, Condition Monitoring Section. The
ambient temperature was 20Q e.
Date and Hours Primary Temp. at Temp. at Temp Tan Capacitance
Time energised current Bar body at Shorting Delta pF
in Amp Primary CT cores conductor
QC QC QC
(Note 1)
21/1/2000 0 780 20.4 20.4 20.4
21/1/2000 35mins 782 32.8 61.5
21/1/2000 1hr 785 38.1 67
21/1/2000 2hr 783 40.2 65.5
21/1/2000 3hr 785 42 67
23/1/2000 Ohr 0 20 20 20 0.0039 587.5
23/1/2000 20 min 780 26.3 46.8
23/1/2000 40 min 775 28.8 31 58.1 0.00391 587.4
23/1/2000 1hr 770 29.2 32 62.6 0.00395 587.4
23/1/2000 2hr 770 32 32 65.6 0.00415 587.3
23/1/2000 3hr 770 33.1 33 66.2 0.00423 587.4
23/1/2000 4hr 770 32.6 33 64 0.00425 587.5
23/1/2000 48hr 770 32.6 33 68 0.00425 587.5
Table 7.4: Temperature response ofCT to back energIsatlOn
Note 1: The temperature of the CT body measured at the point of the secondary cores
was measured with an infra red camera on the epoxy body. This is not an accurate
measurement of the temperature in the secondary cores, as the temperature dissipated
from the secondary cores to the outer epoxy.
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Table 7.4 indicates that the back energising causes heating in the bar primary, the CT
body near secondary cores and on the shorting conductor. The temperature saturates
after 4 hours but remains about 13QC above the ambient temperature at the CT cores
and the bar primary. The temperature on the shorting conductor is at an elevated level
due to the higher resistance of the conductor when compared to the solid conductor.
The capacitance remains constant, but the tan delta increases with the temperature
increase. At the end of this temperature rise test the resistance of the secondary cores
of the CT were measured to determine if any damage had taken place.






Table 7.5: IndIcatmg the secondary core wmdmg resIstances are stIll consIstent with
the original measurements, indicating no damage to windings due to heat run.
7.1.3 Tan delta and capacitance changes induced by changes to the oil
The insulating oil was drained from the CT. At various intervals, offline tan delta and
capacitance measurements were taken. The purpose of this was to verify that as the
insulation medium changed so to the measurement results changed, to determine if the
results could be quantified.
Oil level (1) Tan delta Capacitance pF
318(1)/1 00% full of 0.00391 586.7
oil
250(1) oil/68(1) air 0.00391 586.23
200(1) oil/118(1) air 0.00435 584.6
100(1) oil! 218(1) 0.00459 581.9
air
0(1) oil/318(1) air 0.00459 578.55
Table 7.6: IndIcatmg an mcreasmg tan delta and a decreasmg capacitance as the
insulating oil is removed and air is introduced as the insulating medium together with
the oil impregnated paper.
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The above results show that as the insulation medium changes from a higher purity
(namely oil) to a lower purity (air) with the probable additional influence on the
leakage current of resistive leakage across the inner surface of the porcelain where the
oil has been removed, the absolute tan delta readings are affected significantly. The
capacitance value also reduces.
7.1.4 The impact of contamination of standoff insulators on the measured tan
delta values.
Early experience with field installations of HVIEWS indicated that the system was
sensitive to environmental factors, especially rain. To investigate this further and
recommend mitigative measures that could be applied in the field, the following
experimental program was undertaken.
The CT metal base was mounted on disc insulators. These insulators were installed
between the CT metal base and the earth plane. These insulators enabled the leakage
current for the tan delta measurement of the HV insulation to be collected between the
CT metal base and the earth conductor. Various concentration levels of saline solution
were sprayed onto the insulators. This introduces a parallel resistance path into the
measuring circuit, thereby changing the tan delta reading and falsely indicating
degraded insulation. This same situation was occurring with the HVIEWS
installations in the field where during rain conditions, the parallel resistive path
caused by the rainwater across the insulators was negatively effecting the tan delta
measurement results. The purpose of this investigation was to determine the effect of
a parallel resistive path caused by rainwater on the tan delta measurement.
Figure 7.1 below indicates how the rain/introduced saline water, bridges across the
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Figure 7.1: The insulator on the base ofthe CT being bridged out by rainwater ingress
effecting the tan delta measurements [33].
The circuit used (Figure 7.2) consisted of the CT having a capacitance of 588.5 pF in
series with the capacitor divider unit (CDU) with a capacitance of 2.2micro farads.
Water with different saline concentrations was sprayed across the insulators. This
effectively introduced a parallel resistive path across the 2.2-microfarad capacitor the
voltage source was 265 volts injected across the circuit. The magnitude and phase
displacement of the output voltage over the 2.2 micro Farad capacitance was

















Figure 7.2: The model of the circuit used to test the influence of saline water on the
output leakage current to the HVIEWS unit to determine the change in relative tan
delta.
This research experiment equates to the similar effect experienced in the field during
rain conditions. All tests were conducted with an input voltage of 265Vac across the
circuit and measuring the output voltage magnitude with a Fluke 77 and comparing
the output sine wave in each case to the original case on an oscilloscope.
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Saline water Output Changes to the output Relative tan delta on
Concentration Voltage Sine wave, VO HVIEWS to reference
(microSiemens per
cm)
No water 63.5 Clear 0%
Tap water (250) 45.77 Distorted, shift in phase -52%
Saline (345) 28.9 Slight phase shift from
reference
Saline (500) 29.22 Further phase shift
from reference
Saline (912) 28.89 Further phase shift
from reference
Saline (2400) 25.9 +33%
Saline( I 0000) 25.4 -7.2%
Saline (75000) 21.5 Further phase shift -20.54%
from reference
Table 7.7: Indicating that the introductIOn of a salIne solutIOn applIed across the test
unit insulators, distorts the leakage current input to the HVIEWS system in both
magnitude and phase displacement, rendering the results inaccurate.
Silicon grease was smeared onto the insulators, and when saline water was
introduced, the tan delta measurement was stable as the water droplets collected on
the surface of the silicon grease. Only when the water droplets built up into a pool of
water and covered the total surface of the grease and bridged the area across the
insulators, did the tan delta readings distort again. The silicon grease was later used in
the field application, where tan delta results recorded during rain conditions were
influenced to a lesser degree, than was found prior to the use of the grease, and proved
to maintain their accuracy.
7.1.5 Summary of laboratory work
The laboratory work indicated the following:
• prior to the electrical testing undertaken, the CT tested was in a good condition
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• the back energisation enabled the circulation of the full load primary current in the
primary of the CT. This full load current could be used to simulate load heating
conditions as would be experienced in the normal operational condition
• the back energisation causes heating in the secondary coils of the CT which could
be detected through the body of the epoxy head of the CT
• the tan delta measurement of the CT insulation increases as the temperature
Increases
• damage caused by overheating the secondary CT coils is not easily detected by
electrical resistance testing of the coils
• changes in the composition of the insulating material is detected in the tan delta
measurements
• any bridging of the measurement circuit of the HVIEWS system results in the
false indication of degrading insulation in the CT being measured.
7.2 Research carried out in various substations where HVIEWS is
installed
During the period that this research was being carried out at Tugela and in the
laboratory of the University of Natal, on-line relative tan delta monitoring systems
were in operation at various transmission substations. A number of incidences
occurred at these stations during this period and the transmission operational staff
requested assistance in determining the impact of these incidents. The following
incidents were investigated:
• Illovo CT incident
• Duvha power station CT incident
• Hendrina transformer bushing incident
7.2.1 IIIovo eT incident
At Illovo substation the HVIEWS system had indicated that one of the CT's was
trending an increasing relative tan delta condition. The CT was removed from service
and sent to the HV test laboratory at ABB in Pretoria for testing and analysis. The
incident was investigated to verify the performance ofHVIEWS.
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Test Results
• Partial discharge test at 450kV to earth - < 20pC.
• Tan delta - 0.0038
• Capacitance - 650pF
• Insulation resistance - infinity
The CT was found to be in good condition. A second CT was put in the place of the
removed CT, this CT had been off line tan delta tested prior to installation and was
found to be in order. Once energised the HVIEWS continued to display an increasing
tan delta trend. The installation was tested and rainwater was found to have penetrated
a surge arrestor effectively creating a parallel path for the leakage current and
distorting the trending.
7.2.2 Duvha power station eT incident
At Duvha Power station the HVIEWS system indicated a CT on generator number 5
was experiencing an increasing relative tan delta condition. The 600MW generator
was switched out of service for off line tests to be done to the eT. The incident was
investigated to verify the performance ofHVIEWS.
At Duvha power station the 600MW generator was shut down, the off line tan delta
test on the CT proved that the CT was in order. The installation was checked and a
piece of insulating rubber between the CT metal base and the CT secondary core,
cable gland was found to be pinched and creating a resistive parallel path for the
leakage current, thereby distorting the tan delta trend. The rubber insertion was found
to have been installed with the wrong thickness material and was replaced with
thicker rubber. After re-energisation of the generator circuit the relative tan delta





















































Figure 7.3: HVIEWS relative tan delta trend for Duvha eT, caused by poor insulation
quality, negatively effecting trending.
Figure 7.3 above is of great interest as it shows a variation in the relative tan delta
measurement due to a fluctuation in the leakage current caused in this case by faulty
insulation. As can be seen in the figure, in the early morning when the dew condensed
across the pinched rubber insulation, the relative tan delta increased and as the heat of
the day dried out the condensation, the relative tan delta measurement returned to
normal. After the insulation was repaired, the relative tan delta measurement returned
to normal.
7.2.3 Hendrina transformer bushing incident
At Hendrina power station, the HVIEWS system was installed on a coupling
transformer. Within days of the installation the transformer failed and the imminent
failure was not detected by HVIEWS. The failure was investigated to verify the
performance ofHVIEWS.
The failure of the transformer bushing had not been captured and alarmed by the
HVIEWS system. The investigation into the failure had found that a particular
bushing was the cause of the failure. The type of bushing had caused 3 other failures
of transformers on the system. These failures were caused by increasing partial
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discharge in the bushing, degrading the insulation and resulting in a short circuit.
When a drill down was done into the HVIEWS data that had been captured it showed
that not enough data had been stored to set up a trend as the service period had been
too short, but instantaneous data indicated that a failure was imminent.
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Figure 7.4: Instantaneous data signals from HVIEWS at Hendrina power station.
From Figure 7.4 above it can be seen that the relative tan delta signals from the
leakage currents of the 132kV bushings on the B-R and the W-B phases started to
increase. The common signal was the B phase, which was distorting the signal,
probably due to the increasing partial discharges degrading the insulation. The
investigation into the transformer failure proved that the failure of the B phase
bushing was root cause of the incident. Figure 7.4 indicates that the increase was
gradual from 0 to 2% relative delta over a period of 16 days (9/9/99 to 25/9/99) On
25/9/99 the relative tan delta readings increased from2% to 8% rapidly over a period
ofabout 10 hours.
The curve in this figure above was the first positive feedback from an operational
bushing failure, and indicated that HVIEWS could monitor failing HV insulation.
This was also the first indication ofthe rapid nature ofthe failure.
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7.3 Summary
The research undertaken in the laboratory of the University of Natal as well as at
various Transmission stations to investigate the climatic influence on the recorded
measurements of the on-line monitoring system concluded that these external
influences introduced changes to the measurements that closely followed
measurements captured during the failure of HV insulation. These influences may
impact on the credibility of the system. It is important to understand and isolate these
influences when utilizing the HVIEWS system in the current format. The results of
this problem may have costly implications if healthy plant is removed from service
due only to the external influence of climatic conditions. The laboratory research also




DISCUSSION AND ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS
The CT's installed at Tugela test station, and in the laboratory, although they were 25
years old, were tested and found to be in operational condition. The assumption that
the bellows was perishing and introducing moisture was unfounded.
The research undertaken at EPRI, indicated that accelerating the failure was not as
easy as expected. Many previous projects involving the introduction of water or air
had not induced failure. The most responsive method to ensure accelerated aging and
failure had been the back energisation of the secondary CT circuits.
As this project required the establishment of the capability of the HVIEWS system to
track insulation degradation, the success of this project could only be established if
accelerated insulation aging took place. For this reason the back energisation of the
secondary circuits was introduced.
Laboratory tests indicated that the back energisation induced some heating in the unit.
The power output of the secondary cores, which were back energised, exceeded the
core rating by a factor of 10 times. Although the back energisation in the laboratory
was in service for days on end (48 hours), and the temperature increase measured was
13°C, electrical tests indicated no damage to the cores.
The CT's at Tugela which were subjected to the HV stress (275kV) only (without the
back energisation) were found to have experienced no damage, even for periods of up
to 5 days as in the case of CT failure 3. Only when the back energisation was
introduced together with the high voltage, did failure take place. Failures took place
as indicated in Table 8.1 below.
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eT Failure Period back Period of rapid tan % Relative tan
energised delta variations delta variation
1 5H35 1H24 7.35%
2 7H21 1H13 7.8%
3 6H36 OH51 4.6%
Average 6H31 IH13 6.58%
Table 8.1: Indication of the period of back energIsatlOn, penod of rapId vanatlOns and
the tan delta variations on the units that failed under test.
Although the cause of failure was thought to have been caused by the back
energisation, this fact could not be confinned after failure 1 and 3 as these units were
burnt out beyond the point where the root cause of failure could be detennined.
Failure 2 had not been a catastrophic failure and the subsequent tear down of this CT
indicated that the secondary cores had overheated. This heat caused the insulation of
the secondary cores to burn, fonning bubbles in the insulation gap between the
earthed secondary core shield and the HV, on the outer conductive tape on the outer
layer of the insulation. This bridging of the insulation probably caused the flash over
and failure.
The HVIEWS system had been programmed to trend slow moving variations of
relative tan delta and so did not alert to the degrading insulation, but the instantaneous
data records had captured the varying relative tan delta. This variation may have been
caused by a stream of bubbles introducing partial discharge and resistive leakage
currents in the insulation body of the CT. These resistive leakage currents were in
parallel with the original capacitive leakage currents, resulting in the varying relative
tan delta measurements. This indicated that the HVIEWS system was tracking the
changes in the state of the insulation.
The HVIEWS system produced similar results for the 3 failures.
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As the HVIEWS system produced consistent results for the back energisation failure
induced mode, the second failure mode was introduced to see if consistency could
again be achieved.
The second failure mode was introduced by damaging layers of the insulation, as
described in chapter 6 concerning failure 4, thereby changing the capabilities of the
insulation. Figure 6.13 indicates that immediately the CT was energised, the relative
tan delta jumped to 6%, indicating a change in the leakage current flowing through
the insulation. This change is due to the resistive circuit caused by the holes in parallel
with the capacitive circuit of the insulation. Again the HVIEWS system tracked the
change in the degrading insulation, showing consistency with the first 3 failures. The
rapid tan delta variations took place over 6 hours prior to failure, with a variation of
relative tan delta of up to 11%.
The relative tan delta of this unit showed a number of jumps from 6% to 15% then
settled back down to 9.5%. These jumps in the relative tan delta may be due to low
power partial discharges taking place in the holes, in the damaged insulation, then the
holes could have squeezed closed, cutting off the discharge. As the leakage current
was high, this probably continued to cause local overheating of the insulation until
failure took place.
The time period during which large variations in the relative tan delta took place,
averaged out at IH13 with the shortest time taken, being 51 minutes. If system
operators were warned 30 minutes prior to the need to isolate plant from service, this
would be enough time to carry out a planned shut down. The HVIEWS rate of change
alarm system could timeously warn system operators to safely shut down the faulty
CT.
The incidents experienced with the HVIEWS system in vanous operational
substations indicated the following results as part ofthe overall assessment.
At Illovo the unit was unnecessarily removed from service and sent for testing,
because of a faulty surge arrestor, which is placed in the circuit in parallel with the
monitoring system. This introduced a resistive path in parallel with the monitored
capacitive leakage current and resulted in varying tan delta measurements.
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The Duvha Power station incident, was again the introduction of a parallel resistive
leakage current, distorting the tan delta measurements, this was again due to a faulty
component (insulation of CT from ground) in parallel with the measuring devices.
Laboratory tests indicated that the introduction of saline water, creating a parallel
resistive leakage current path, resulted in the variation of the measured tan delta.
Figure 7.3 indicates an increasing variation III the Duvha relative tan delta
measurement in the early morning of every day as the moisture in the air condensed
and bridged the insulation, as the heat of the day increased and the moisture dried up,
the tan delta measurement decreased.
The Illovo and Duvha incidents and the laboratory testing indicates that moisture,
rain, pollution, failing insulation or any other item, interfering with the integrity of the
measuring circuit, results in a varying tan delta reading similar to that experienced
when insulation of the CT degrades. This results in confusion for operators and the
unnecessary isolation of plant. Field experience of the HVIEWS system indicated that
the system performed poorly under rain or high humidity conditions due to the water
introducing a parallel resistive path for the leakage current to follow. This failing in
the system requires addressing.
The HVIEWS system at Hendrina had not been in service for sufficient time to collect
enough data to set up a trend. Analysis and manipulation of recorded instantaneous
data, showed that the relative tan delta of the blue phase bushing was varying. The
variation took place over a period of 17 days with the relative tan delta reaching 6%.
This varying tan delta can be traced to the variation in the leakage current, indicating
a degradation of the insulation. The blue phase bushing failed.
The HVIEWS relative on line tan delta monitoring system cannot supply absolute
values of tan delta, but only compares one CT to the next one in the monitored loop.
An absolute value can be obtained if a pure gas capacitor is introduced into each loop
for comparison to the other CT's. This research has indicated that absolute tan delta
values are not necessary to determine the condition of the insulation, but the relative
tan delta measurement is a good indication of degrading insulation.
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From the results obtained on the first three failures, the HVIEWS system was
modified to alarm for any relative tan delta measurement, varying by more than 1%
between any two consecutive readings. This modification to the software, successfully
detected the degrading insulation during the fourth failure.
From the results obtained during the four failures, anytime the relative tan delta
exceeded 3% during a bona fide failure process, the CT carried on to failure.
A recommendation to the system operators would be to switch out any plant where
the relative tan delta exceeds the following conditions:
• An increase in relative tan delta of 1% or more between any two consecutive
readings,
• Any relative tan delta measurement exceeding 3%.
Of course this would mean that any variation in relative tan delta, not related to a
bone fide failure, but possibly related to environmental interference, would result in
the switch out of healthy plant. Until the nuisance interference of environmental
influences is solved, it would be safer to switch out plant exceeding the above criteria,
this plant should be further off line tested, to verify a failure.
Future research to enable the successful operation of on-line, relative tan delta
monitoring system should include:
• Mechanisms to eliminate all the external, environmental influences which can
effect the accuracy of the relative tan delta measurements, these to include the
insulation failure of the measured unit to ground, as well as the ingress of water.
• Increased operational experience with active systems on energised networks, in
order to develop enough confidence in the monitoring system to automatically
switch out circuits, which indicate increasing tan delta measurements (similar to
protection systems).
• Lifecycle costing of the monitoring system. As the CT's have an expected life of
30 years, and the monitoring systems are micro processor based with a probable
life span of 8 years, the monitoring system will be replaced 4 times in the life of




An investigation into the ability of an on-line relative tan delta system to detect
incipient failure of oil/paper insulation and hence to send an alarm signal such that the
equipment may be de-energised, prior to catastrophic failure, required the
construction of a special test station in which the investigation could be undertaken.
The following major conclusions may be reached:
• The design of the test station proved satisfactory for the task undertaken.
Catastrophic failures occurred where the effects of the explosions were contained
safely and with minimal impact on the system, particularly after the installation of
the current limiting reactor.
• Back-energisation of the CT's resulted in a far more rapid failure mode than was
expected or predicted.
• The on-line system used in the research detected these rapid deterioration modes.






The back-energisation technique utilised in the research caused a large degree of
overheating in the secondary windings of the CT which then resulted in what is
most likely not a failure mode experienced in practice. It is, however, an effective
means of failing these particular CT's rapidly and enabled conclusions to be
drawn on the on-line system.
Laboratory work confirmed that the CT secondary cores were overheating.
Comparisons between the relative on-line tan delta technique and the 2 off-line
techniques conclude that the 2 off-line techniques correlated but the only
correlation between the on-line and off-line techniques, if the climatic interference
is ignored, is that an increase in on-line relative tan delta indicates failing
insulation, which is the same indication an increase in the off-line absolute tan
delta provides. The measured values have no correlation nor are they repeatable.
A second failure mode was investigated by causing gross damage to the
insulation. This also caused a rapid failure mode that was detected by the on-line
system.
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• Such fast failures were not suspected but the data from a transformer bushing
failure on a unit in service indicated that such a rapid failure mode does occur and
needs to be detected.
• The failure modes observed in this research resulted in typical changes of relative
tan delta values of 0.5% - 4% per hour. Such large changes in relative tan delta
would indicate incipient failure and hence an effective limit of relative tan delta
value changes may be set from this work.
• Evidence of partial discharge activity was found In one case where total
destruction of the eT did not occur.
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6 Schauglas nue bei ETF
7 Kopfgehause nur bei ETF
8 ZentralrohrentlUftung
9 I<lemmstUck




1 Px100 condenser core




6 Sight glass ETF only
7 Head ETF only
8 Central tube vent
9 Clamping flange
10 Draw lead/termmal
11 Test lap cap
12 Omega spring
13 Test tap insulator
8
MeBanschluB-Prinzip;
Bei angeschraubter MeBanschluBkappe ist der Stift der IsolierdurchfUh-
runguber die Omegafeder geerdet. Fur MeBzwecke 4 mm Federbuchse
aufstecken und in diese Laborstecker einfUhren.
Test tap principle:
The pin of the test tap insulator IS earthed over the omega sprtng insIde the
screwed-on cap. For testing purpose, a 4 mm sprtng socket must be slipped
over the pin and then a 4 mm plug can be inserted into the sprtng socket.
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Appendix 2
Operating Principle of CSD (extract from Operating manual for The new loss
tangent bridge was developed at Central Electricity Research Laboratories and is
manufactured under licence in Northern Ireland. by CSD).
Figure 2.1 below shows schematically the general features of the bridge circuit. The
oscillator generates an 80Hz sinewave. This signal is amplified by the power
amplifier and stepped up by the voltage transformer to 600Vrms. The excitation
voltage is used to drive both arms of the bridge circuit. One arm contains the sample
being measured and a fixed winding on the ration transformer, the other arm contains
the standard capacitor and a variable winding on the ratio transformer. The bridge
circuit is balanced by varying the resistance in the standard arm to equalize the phases
of the currents in the two arms, and by varying the number of turns in the variable
winding to balance the current turns of the two windings. At balance the flux
produced in the core of the ratio transformer by one winding is cancelled by the flux
produced by the other. With no flux link in the transformer core, the windings have a
low impedance, this low impedance appears in parallel with any capacitance to earth
so that errors caused by capacitance are small. Capacitance across the voltage
transformer also has little effect on the measurement as it effects both arms of the
bridge equally.
If the bridge arms are not balanced, the currents in the windings will not cancel and a
net flux will be induced in the core of the transformer. This flux is detected by the
third winding on the core, the detector winding. The voltage across this winding is
amplified and filtered, to attenuate interference at power frequency. Phase sensitive
detection is used, both to provide a very narrow bandwidth filter and to discriminate
for the phase out of balance signal. Two separate channels are provided to
independently measure the loss tangent balance and the capacitance balance.
Additional low pass filters after the phase sensitive detectors have a varying
bandwidth, which depends on the amplitude of the signal. Large out of balance
signals, such as are experienced during course balancing of the bridge are filtered out
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least and so experience a shorter delay than small out of balance signals which require
more filtering to achieve a balance null.
Both isolated and earthed samples can be accurately measured using the sample earth
switch in the required position.
Figure 2.1 Block diagram of CSD loss tangent test set.
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Appendix 3
Environmental Impact Assessment ofthe Tugela Test Site
This report serves as a assessment towards the activities that would take place at
Tugela substation during the construction, operation and decommissioning of the
Current Transformer (CT) test site, pointing out the various impacts and counter
measure that would be implemented to ensure no adverse affects are caused to the
environment.
5.3.2.1Background information
The Transmission network has an average of 6-8 violent C T failures and 1 or 2
transformer bushing failures a year, resulting in destruction of plant, outages to
customers and even danger to staff. A local RSA designed product bought out by
Rainbow Technologies and installed in some 7 Transmission substations, with 3 more
to go, monitors the leakage current flowing through the insulation and trends this
current with all the other devices in the substation. Any device showing a deviation is
removed from service, as the indication is that the insulating is failing. In theory all
this is very simple but in practice the device has not been monitored to destruction, in
order to set the limits on this Rainbow device to ensure optimal use of our plant
Transmission in conjunction with Technical Research Institute (T R I) have motivated
a project to install a test center to test bushings and C T's and age the insulating to the
point of destruction in order to set limits on the useful monitoring system.
The site selected for this test site was the Tugela substation on the Bloukrans one
275kV feeder at Tugela.The intention was to build an explosion proof test site next
the line and install up to 10 C T's and 3 bushings to be monitored by a Rainbow Tan
Delta test set and to accelerate the aging to destruction. The line will be kept in
service until a point of failure on one of the C T's is reached. The explosion will be
contained in the designed structure as well as any oil spills.
5.3.2.2 Substation layout
Tugela substation is situated on the road between Bergville and Geluksburg and is
±18 Km from Bergville. The substation has 2 x 275 / 132 transformers fed from
Bloukrans and Danskraal substations.
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5.3.2.3 Water
The water table at the substation is ± 38 meters deep.
The substation water supply is from a borehole on the site.
The closest spruit is ± 1 Km towards the northern side of the substation. The spruit
runs from West to East (Hlantchan).
5.3.2.4 Land
The land around the substation is mainly used for agricultural purposes Maize during
the summer months and cattle grazing during winter months.
5.3.2.5 Vegetation
The natural vegetation in and around the substation is veld grass with no known
endangered species.
Trees growing in the area are thorn trees and planted black wattle.
5.3.2.6 Wildlife
(a)Birds
Birds detected in the area are Guinea fowls, Crows, Rock Pigeons, Cape Sparrow and
Cattle Egret.
(b)Animals
Animals such as Rabbit and Porcupine are moving in and on site during night times.
5.3.2.7 Local Community
The substation is situated in a rural farm land area with the farmer closest to the
substation ± 1 Km.
Farm workers live ± 2 Km from the substation.
The Bergville / Geluksburg gravel road passes next to the substation on the Eastern
boundary.
5.3.2.8. Proposed site layout
The bunded and walled area around the C T platform is designed in such a way that
should the C T explode, the walls will prevent oil and porcelain pieces scattering, it
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will confine it to the inside, oil will run within the bunded area into a oil trap, from
where it will be pumped into drums and removed to Mkondeni workshop.
The C T's are each within their own wall preventing one C T damaging those next to
it. Storage area for spare C T's will be in the demarcated area inside the substation.
Oil will be stored in a bunded oil store and be used for refilling of C T's.
5.3.2.9 The impact on the various systems ifaCT explodes
Water
The impact an explosion should have on the surface and underground water would be
minimum. No oil would be spilled outside ofthe design area.
See emergency plan should any spillage occur outside of the bunded area.
Land
Construction Phase
Site will be built on planned future expansion area that became redundant.
Drainage will form part of the existing system on the site. No excavations during
construction phase will take place.
No waste will be dumped on site during construction on or around the property.
Waste will be removed to waste site at Bergvi1le Municipality.
Contractors will ensure that any disturbed land is rehabilitated before leaving the site.
Operational Phase
The land will be maintained and managed III accordance with Transmissions
Environmental Management System based on SABS /ISO 14001 to ensure all risks
are identified and managed proactively.
If oil should spill during explosions into area outside the designed area see E P P for
action to be taken.
Decommissioning Phase
The decommissioning ofthe site will be done after completion of the tests.
The area will be brought back to the state it was before the site was build.
Removal ofwaste will be in line with statutory requirements and Company Policy.
Vegetation
Construction Phase
Grass inside substation will be affected during construction due to vehicles and
construction equipment moving to the test site.
Affected area will be rehabilitated after completion of construction.
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Operation Phase
No impact on vegetation should occur during this phase, should any vegetation impact
occur (oil pollution) the area will be remedied and rehabilitated to its natural state.
Firebreak will be maintained around the property to ensure that fires should it occur
are confined to the site.
See EPP for action should any spill occur.
Wildlife
If aCT explodes the noise would cause all wildlife inside the station to fly or run
away.
As far as it is known no endangered species have been detected in or around the
substation.
Situation will be monitored after each explosion to detennine its impact on wildlife.
Local Community
If the C T explodes the affect it will have is that of noise (a bang) to the fanner Mr. C
J Uys living ± 800 meters from the substation, and or the public that could be walking
passed the substation at the time of the explosion.
This situation was discussed with Mr. C J Uys, and he has no objections towards this
site being built inside the substation.
The directions of the wind is mostly from a West direction which means that it blows
from the fanners residence towards the substation and it could cause the noise to be
less than nonnal.
Employees
The substation is not manned on a daily basis and I to 2 employees might be on site
during the day, depending on the work required at the substation.
As the test site will be in a walled area the possibility of porcelain pieces flying
around is limited.
Noise would be the only affect for that second the C T explodes.
The test site will also have a lockout system implemented to ensure that employees do
not enter the site when it is live and or under test conditions.
5.3 2. J0 Conclusion
Taking into account all facts, designs, possible impacts and the preventative measures
in place to prevent or remediate affected spilled areas no negative impact to the
environment should take place.
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Situations will however be monitored and if additional measures are required to
prevent and rehabilitate affected areas it would be implemented.





Fault and Load Studies for Tugela Test Station.
1.1 Load flow studies undertaken with various system contingencies.





Figure 4.1 Load flow study at Tugela Substation with all infeeds in service





Figure 4.2 Load flow study at Tugela Substation with one 275kV infeed out of service













Figure 4.3 Load flow study at Tugela Substation with both 275kV infeeds out of
servIce
Note; MW's load indicated above each line, % loading indicated below line
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Fault flow studies undertaken with various system contingencies.
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Figure 4.4 Fault study at Tugela Substation with all infeeds in service
Note; Fault current in Amperes indicated above each line, load angle indicated below
line
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Figure 4.5 Fault study at Tugela Substation with one 275kV infeed out of service












The dala I've used for lines in the area of sludy is taken from the
distribution case. In this case the 132 kV path between Bloukraans and
Tugela is open. When querying this we were told that this 132 k-V path
is normally open when both 275 kV lines are in service. I presume when
you are carrying oul these tests the 132 kV line will be closed, and
I've have done the studies accordingly.
I have faxed you copies of the load flow scenarios of:
both 275 kV Blollkrans - Tugela lines in
service (FIGURE 1)
• one of the 275 kV lines out of service (FIGURE 2)
both 275 kV lines out of service (FIGURE 3)
The values above the lines on these figures indicate the MW power
flow and the value below the line indicates the % loading on the line.
I have then also sent you copies of the fault calculations. In this
case the values indicate the amount of fault current flowing on the
line when there is a 3 phase fault at Tugela 275 kV busbar. The value
above the line is the magnitude of fault current (A) and that below
the line is the angle. The values at the base of the Tugela busbar are
the magnitude and angle of the total fault level. Again I've sent you
the Ihree scenarios of:
both 275 kV lines in service (FIGURE 4)
one crf the 275 kV lines out of service (FIGURE 5)
both 275 k.V lines out of service (FIGURE 6)
To answer your specific questions:
When both Bloul<rans - Tugela 275 kV lines are out, the 132 kV line is
loaded up to 93% of its 75 degree th.ermal rating. Hence the load can
be maintained. Following the loss of the second 275 kV line a voltage
drop from 138 kV to 122 kV can be expected at the Tugela 132 kV
busbar. With appropriate tapping of transformers at Bloukrans, this
voltage can be increased to 126 I<V.
The fault current on each Bloul<rans - Tugela line when there is a
fault at Tugela is presently 3.8 kA. When one of the lines is out, the
overall faull level decreases. and the faull current on the other line
increases to 5.2 kA.
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Figure 7.3 Design drawing of Tugela Test Station showing the side elevation
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Appendix 8 The oil collection and fire extinguishing system at Tugela Test Station
.Scenari..£1lNo water in!the ~nk)
Oil will f:ow into the inner chamber. Since e2cn CT contains 2. '!()It.;me of oil :::400 litres ,r.e i:~r;e,
chamber WIll contain 3UD litres at this Oil. Depending on hew much oil burns in the drain inside
of ttle test chcmbers, arid we r=rne.in wit.., !essrr.an 300 Ii~es 01 oil ,the air trep will net :,0,
formed and ,[16 oil wW cOntinue bUffi:ng inside the tank. See figure below
-,-- lllIlI ClWfEl
Scenario 2 (Tank fuil of :.vater)
The oil from ti,e CT WlJl flew truo me lJ?J1k. This oil will displace an 2~Currt of w2ter equ2i to its
volume. This ~Nater wiit then overflow imo the subsoil drain through the connecting pipe. in this
condition aIr supply into the tank <Niil be sealed cff and the fire wii! stop burning. See fig. below.
-.-- iU.L'l0Wl:E
Figure 5.7. Diagram indicating how the oil sump will block off the oxygen and
extinguish any fire in the oil.
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